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O' ^^/c^^(>^ INTRODUCTIOH
A great deal of material has been written concerning
finance and the market for securities, and in recent years much
has been said about stock market psychology. But few have taken
the time to analyze the real meaning of stock market and business
psychology. In most cases it is talked of as a sort of an in-
tangible element; something apart from individuals but at the
same time closely allied with them. With this in mind the present
;study has been \mdertaken, in order to ascertain, if possible,
just how the behavior of individuals effects the market for
securities, the relation of the emotions to these activities,
and how these traits frequently are capitalized.
Someone has said that while the United States is the richest
nation so far as wealth is concerned, in the matter of economic
knowledge, it is one of the poorest. This also nay be applied
to knowledge of the "human element" in business and finance.
People recognize that certain situations bring about certain
results, but few take the trouble to study the causes, so that
when history repeats itself, as it invariably has in the past,
they make the same mistakes. The fact that time has brought
repetition of human events should in itself be a matter of con-
sideration in the cycles of business, stock prices and commodity
price movements, for those who use these mediums for investment
of surplus funds.

The writer has had a number of years experience in
observing the reaction of individuals to stock market
fluctuations and through personal attention to thousands of
letters from investors has been able to associate to a con-
siderable extent the connection between the elements of human
behavior and the so-called business cycles and stock market
movements. People express most of the psychological factors
through their correspondence, and it is noticeable that people
\mconsciously reflect courage or lack of it, strength or ^veakness,
fear and its close relative, anxiety; as well as other human
traits in their letters, particularly those which deal with their
investments. In order to arrive at conclusions, however, it is
necessary to trace the growth of the market for securities and
study the reaction of individuals and groups of individuals xinder
various impulses.
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THE HUMAN ELET/ENT IE THE SECURITY MRKETS.
The development of markets. The development of econorfiic
life to its present complex status has resulted in a gigantic
institution, the market for securities. This groivth hss not
been a matter of few years, but of centuries. True, the iriarket
for securities as v/e know it, has developed in a comparatively
few years, but the principles behind it date as far back as history
is recorded. From the beginning of the human race there has been
barter and exchange. Ti^ith the growth of the races, development of
industry has been accompanied, step by step, by the constant ex-
pansion of markets which could distribute the products of industry.
Even in Africa the savages are accustomed to market places. The
battered temple pylons of ancient Egypt, show us the fishermen,
the weaver, the potter, the farmer, and the metal worker bartering
their several products in market places centuries before currency
was invented. Long before Solon instituted the Athenian coinage
system, the fisherman from the Piraeus bartered his fish for the
barley of the Attican farmiers. Such, too, was the origin of the
greet Forum of Rome.* The growth of the British empire also
aided materially the development of domestic and world n^arkets.
Under the manorial system which prevailed in England prior
to the Norman Conquest, and which did not entirely disappear until
the sixteenth century, each manor produced prpctically everything
needed by its inhabitants. Nobles borrowed occasionally from one
another, but commercial credit as we vmderstand it, was unknown.
Meeker, The York of the Stock Exchange, page 30.
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In fact, even coined money played a relatively unimportant part.
The tovms that harbored the comparatively small amount of trade,
used money to some extent to transact some of their business with
the surrounding country, but in the earlier centuries practically
all business ;Tas carried on the the form of barter, A greater use
of metallic money was the forei*unner of the introduction of credit.
In the feudal system, the lord of the manor ovmed the land and the
work was performed by his subjects. The respective rights and
duties of the lord and the subject were defined by immemorial
usage. They both received their shares of the product of the land
and labor in material goods, which they exchanged in the towns for
anything they happened to lack. The modern American fair is an
outgrovrth of the early English fairs, whichy\originated to facilitate
exchange of products. Only in the towns were coins used to any
extent. International relations were mostly in the form of war;
foreign trade being practically \inkovm until the latter centuries
of the feudal era. In about the thirteenth century, hov;-ever, a
demand arose on the continent for English wool. This international
trade, at first only with nations located nearby, brought gold
and silver into England and a greater use of money resulted;
first in the port cities, then the towns, then the villages, and
finally the use of money increased the trade between the manors
and the towns.
This change from the barter method of the manorial system of
the thirteenth century of the money method of the sixteenth.
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was quite gradual during several hundred years. As commerce
grew in importance and political conditions became more stable,
the practice of granting credit naturally increased. Bills of
exchange were introduced first by the Jevrish merchants of
Florence to avoid the unnecessary transportation of money and
later as a means of concealing and safe-guarding their wealth.
By the middle of the seventeenth century the business men of
London had developed business methods that would seem quite
familiar to us if we could transport ourselves back into that
period.*
The establishment of currency made trade easier between
individuals of the same nation, but trade between nations even
then encountered many difficulties. The currency of one country
was vastly different from that of another country, so there
grew up a kind of clearing house system, in which the money
changers balanced the various currencies. The biblical story
of Christ driving the money changers out of the temple is an
illustration of this development. As nations gradually became
at peace with each other, however, financial clearings became
more systemic, until the present day exchange among nations
involves billions of dollars.
The rise of the security exchanges. With the growth
of the security method of financing, it is natural that a
market of some kind should develop to handle the business of
those who wished to sell their certificates. The early
* Adapted ^rom address of John E. Kovensky, vice-
chairman The Bank of America, on"Panics and Prophets,"
before annual banfuet of the Engineers' Society.
FiCranton, Penna , Jan. 29,1931.
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security markets were not the large and far-reaching
organizations of today, of course, but the London Stock
Exchange was for many decades the largest institution of its
type in the world, due to the earlier development of stock
companies in that country and the worldv/ide expansion of the
British Empire, The strategic position of the port of New
York early gave indications that this would be one of the im-
portant market places of the new nation. On Jlay 17, 1792
tv/enty-four brokers subscribed to the original brokers*
agreement. This was the first organized stock market in New
York, The brokers met \mder a buttonwood tree at what is now
68 Wall Street. On March 8, 1817 the members adopted a con-
stitution and the name of "New York Stock and Exchange Board",
The name was changed to the New York Stock Exchange on January
29, 1863. On April 8, 1817, the organization moved indoors,
renting a second floor room at 40 Wall Street. They sub-
sequently moved some ten or twelve times before locating on
their present site at the corner of Broad and 7^all Streets.
It was in the bond market, however, that the real
foundation of the present Stock Exchange lies, for it was to
provide a market for the first securities of the United States
vrtiich were authorized by the first Congress in 1790 that brokers
assembled under the traditional buttonwood tree. Since that
time the growth of the market for bonds and similar evidences of
corporate and governmental debt has been steady and, at times.
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very rapid. In 1890, Just 100 years after the first bonds
of the United States Government were issued, trading in bonds
on the floor of the New York Stock Exchange for the year
totalled in excess of $400,000,000 and in 1922 a little more
than a quarter of a century, later, they amounted to more than
ten times that sum. Value of memberships rose from $4500 in
1870 to a high of |625,000 in 1929.*
Go-yernnent financing. Inasmuch as stability of government
has been essential in the development of a nation's business, it
is natural that this form of financing should begin earlier in
history than the more modern corporate financing. The rise of
a great nation brought extraordinary expenditures for maintaining
an army and otherwise protecting the nation's interests. Too
frequently, also, the habits of the reigning monarch were such
that taxes were not sxifficient to meet the demands. Costly
wars depleted financial resources and governments had to borrow
to defray expenses. Naturally this form of borrowing has
undergone great changes in the last few centuries. Originally
most of the principal governments were monarchies, and before
national debts managed by parliaments and assemblies were insti-
tuted, governmental loans were obtained personally and assumed
by the sovereign. The great but troublous reign of ^ueen Elizabeth
It ^
was financed through loans made by the Antwerp money-lenders.
The royal jewels were frequently pawned to finance some enterprise,
either worthy or otherwise, according to the whim of the reigning
* Foregoing from N. Y. Stock Exchange Year Book 1929-1930.
**Adapted from The ,'/ork of the Stock Exchange, K'eeker Page 4
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sovereign.
With the French and the American Revolutions came more
direct government oy the people. Since about 1700, borrowing
by governments has been conducted by the sale of interest-
bearing certificates of indebtedness to private investors,
and practically all of the nations of the world today obtain
funds by this method. Of course, the ideal method of finan-
cing governments would be to have a perfectly balanced budget,
but in order to bring about this happy situation, it would be
necessary for the world to be at peace for centuries until all
the nations had a chance to pay off war debts, etc, and never
to spend more than received through the normal sources of revenue.
Various methods have been advanced for clearing up these debts,
the most recent being the simple expedient of cancellation,
YJhile such a method is not at ail popular, especially with the
creditor nation, it has not yet been proved that this would not
be the most logical procedure. The principle is not essentially
different from the individual or corporation that becomes so
heavily in debt that the payment of the indebtedness is practically
impossible. In that event, bankruptcy and reorganization is
necessary. In a like manner, the nation that becomes overburdened
with debts faces two alternatives, cancellation or, worse revolu-
tion. The economic principle of "charging all the traffic will
bear" is just as applicable to national life as to the individual.
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Early stock conpanies« Just as the basis for
government financing originated in the early history of the
human race, so the stock corporations owe their beginning
to the early forms of business endeavor. Simple business
partnerships, in which tvro or more men engage in an enter-
prise together, are as old as the practice of barter arid
exchange. But the stock company did not begin to assume
its present proportions until after the industrial revolution.
This development required more capital than the partnership
form of organization could raise to finance the needs of the
enterprise. Consequently, the plan was devised v/hereby a
share in the business was sold to disinterested parties.
Probably the most important events leading to the
development of the stock company were the discoveiy of America
and the Industrial Revolution, Early attempts were made by
Raleigh and other British explorers to establish colonies in
the nev/ country, and these were financed through partnerships.
Their repeated failure, however, proved that a few wealthy men
could not raise sufficient capital to successfully finance
these attempts. Accordingly, crude Joint stock companies were
formed in the early part of the seventeenth century for this
purpose.* J, Edv/ard ileeker, economist for the New York Stock
Exchange, in his book "The V/ork of the Stock Exchange", says,
concerning this development: "ils a result, the first pennanent
European settlement in this country at Jamestown in 1607 was
* The V/ork of the Stock Exchange, Lieeker, Page 10
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established "by the London Company. Financially speaking,
the Pilgrim fathers vrere holders of .labor-shares in a sub-
sidiary of the Plymouth Company, chartered in 1620, The
expenses of the initial venture -which resulted in our present
Hew England states were borne by the stockholders of this
corporation. One share vms allotted to each of the Pilgrims
and additional shares were sold to then for 10 pounds sterling
apiece, so that even in the beginning some of its stock was
held in America, Not all the New Yorkers remember that it
was from sm employee of another ancient corporation, the Dutch
East India Company, that the majestic Hudson River derived its
name. Indeed, the venerable Hudson Bay Company (or, to use
its quaint legal title, »The Governor and Company of Mventurers
of England trading into Hudson»s Bay*), which was organized in
1670 and named after the same intrepid explorer, still exists
after having played a huge part in the economic development of
modern Canada", The French Compagnie des Indes Occidentales
,
and many similar companies also were formed. Vfith the develop-
ment of the nevT world came the necessity of financing trans-
portation systems. At first the canals v;ere regarded as the
logical means of transcontinental transportation, but with the
invention of the steam engine, the railroad era began. The
large amount of money necessary to put a railroad in operation,
before a single dollar of revenue could be received, made the
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security method of raising capital ideal for this type of
business. The greater part of the railroad expansion in
this country came in the latter part of the 19th century.
Since the beginning of the 20th century there has been little
if any railroad construction. Indeed, Avithin the past ten
years, the competition of the automobile has brought about
the abandonment of many miles of small lines.
Speculation and its connection with securities. Specu-
lation is closely associated with industrial grov/th. A new
industry necessarily entails a large degree of risk. Under
our present economic system a new development draws a large
number of individuals into the business, many of vihom are
inexperienced in business generally and in the new industry in
particular. The popularity of the radio during and after the
world v/ar is a striking example of this point. Many radio
manufacturing companies and a large nximber of radio distributing
concerns were organized to meet the demands of this development.
Sudden changes in the m.echanicel device, however, threw many of
them into bankruptcy, and in the industrial depression of 1929
and 1930, thousands of radio "sets" were throv.-n on the market at
a fraction of their original price.
That speculation has a place in economic developm.ent
,
hovrever, was brought out by Richard VvTiitney, president of the
New York Stock Exchange, in an address before the Illinois Chamber
of Commerce, at the Hotel Stevens, Chicago, on Oct. 10, 1930, v^hen
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he said: "Speculation is profoundly important in building
up any country, and in establishing high standards of living
for everyone. True as this has been at all times in all
countries, it has been particularly so in United States,
which ovxes more to speculation than any other nation in
History, Conservative saving and investment have been the
secret behind the grovTth of many of the older European countries
and have been important factors also in America, but his
country has from its very beginning depended upon and benefited
by bold and constant speculations of all kinds. It is v/orth
recalling that the North American continent v/as discovered by
the mercantile speculators of Europe, who were trying to discover
a short route to the spice islands of the Orient, It v/as
colonized by hardy pioneers who staked not merely their property
but even their very lives on the wholly speculative proposition
that they could win a better living for themselves in the wilder-
ness of this continent than in the settled communities of Europe.
Every great business developed in this country has likewise
depended on speculation. Our vast and efficient railways are,
of course, an outstanding instance. Our pioneers did not inherit,
as did their European contemporaries, well Duilt roads which were
the result of centuries of gradual effort. They had to create
a vast netvrork of transportation by their own efforts.
"Speculation has not only served our country in the past but
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is still continuing to serve it. New enterprises are
constantly arising, V^ithin the past fer/r decades the auto-
movile industry, which today ranks as one of the greatest of
our productive enterprises, has been brought from its early
beginnings to its present high position largely by capital
furnished by speculators. Today vre are actually seeing the
early stages of the developnent of aviation, 7/hat was a
few years ago the aiausement of wealthy sportsmen or the
business of a few visionaries has, by gradual stages, become
an essential of war and a recognized means of high-speed
transportation, 7/hile the furture is still too uncertain
for us to tell when air travel and transportation will become
not merely a possibility but a commonplace in our lives,
aviation companies are being set up and are askinq; speculators
to furnish the capital which is essential if they are to
progress. This capital is furnished not only through the sale
of securities, but from other unexpected sources that see a
speculative possibility in the further development of aviation.
In the last few years both the North and South Poles have been
surveyed from the air, but fevi people realize that a large part
of the funds necessary to finance these various flints was
contributed by scientific societies, which anticipated the im-
portance of the discoveries to be made, and by our nevrspapers
vrhich foresavf the nevrs value of the experience these explorers
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inight have.
"If we are to have progress, we must depend upon the
speculator to finance the risks involved. Speculation is
in fact the price of progress, We may condemn the occasional
excesses of speculation, vre may censure its wastefulness, but
we cannot ignore the fact that the willingness to take large
risks for large possible profits has changed this country
from a wilderness to the wealthiest nation in the vrorld".
Early forms. The early forms of speculation were not
essentially different in character from the more recent ones.
The purchasers of an interest in the companies which financed
the American colonies were assuming the same degree of risk as
the buyer of stocks in modern times, and perhaps greater. The
chief difference was in the attitude of the speculator. He
recognized the risk and was prepared to take the chances in-
volved. Furthermore, he bought an interest in the enterprise,
rather than a share of stock about which he knov/ nothing.
Speculation in gold was one of the developments along this line
in the history of jteierican finance. *The famous "Black Friday"
episode on Sept. 24, 1869 was the result of overspeculation in
that commodity.
It is a mistake to think of speculation as being confined
to stocks and bonds, however. There frequently have been
* See Tv/enty Eight Years in 'Jail St., by Henry Clews, page 181
chapter 2i,
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"booms" in comiaodities, sections of land, etc. One of the
most famous was the "South Sea Bubble", a financial scheme
organized in England in about 1711, and collapsed in 1720.*
This scheme was proposed by the Earl of Oxford to fund a
floating debt of 10,000,000 pounds sterling, the purchasers
of which should become stockholders in a corporation, the
South Sea Company, which was to have monopoly of the trade
with Spanish South America, and a part of the capital stock
of which was to constitute the fund. The refusal of Spain
to enter into commercial relations with England made the
privileges of the company worthless; but by means of a series
of speculative operations and the infatuation of the people,
its shares were inflated from 100 pounds sterling to 1,050
pounds sterling, A somewhat similar episode occurred in the
period from 1924 to 1925 during the Florida Land boom. Large
sections of land vvere developed into cities and tovms. Streets
were paved, lighting systems were erected, and. the price of
lots rose from a fev; hundred dollars to $30,000 or more. In
the subsequent collapse, thousands of land speculators lost
their money. Other famous speculations were the Louisiana
land boom, speculation in tulip bulbs in Holland 1630 to 1635
and, in the Civil '.'.'ar period, the great railroad speculative
era which culminated in the panic of 1873.
* Century Dictionary,
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New companies. The stock of a new company
necessarily contains a greater degree of risk than one
which has become estaolished and has built up a substantial
surplus. In the early days of the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company, it was almost impossible to sell the
stock. Few people vrere willing to take a chance in the
nevj- "trinket", and an editorial in a ".Tashington, D, C. nevrs-
paper characterized the project as a sort of "fad" which
would soon pass away. Yet at the present time the stock of
this gigantic institution is regarded as one of the soundest
of investments. Another striking illustration is the United
States Steel Corporation, This company was organized in 1901
and the difficulties it had in the early days of its existence
are indicated by the fact that its shares sold as low as 8 s/s
in 1904, and attained a high of 26lf in the bull market of 1929,
Management . The size of a company is a direct
reflection of the calibre of the men who were instrumental in
its development, A history of these successful corporations
would reveal in most instances, that men with exceptional
ability have brought them to the front. On the other hand,
another concern formed at about the same time v/ith practically
the sarre opportunity for growth, either has remained in the
second or third place or has been obliged to consolidate with
some other unit of the same industry. The management of the

-17-
successful corporations, therefore, has been composed of
men who not only have had the ability to organize, but have
had the vision to keep abreast of economic changes. This
is particularly true of the manufacturing industries, where
competition is apt to be very keen. The best illustration
of this point in recent years has been the grovrth of the
,
automobile industry, of which the Ford Liotor Company and the
General Motors Corporation have become the dominant units.
Certainly no company in American history has been a more
striking example of the efficiency of management than the
Ford Motor Company, On the other hand, a good deal depends
upon the kind of business. The best management in the world
cannot keep a company prosperous which is associated with an
obsolete or declining industry. This is well illustrated in
the steady decline in the earnings and investments status of
many of the street railway systems since the advent of the
automobile in large numbers, particularly in the suburban
lines connecting small cities and tovms. Someone has said
that a "Company is no stronger than its management", and this
explains the difference in size of various units in the same
industry very well,
Fre^iuently there is a noticeable deterioration in the
standing of a company after the able men connected with it
have passed away. It has been said that there are but three
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generations from "shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves", meaning
that there are but three lifetimes in the rise and fall of
a company if it stays in the same family. This not alv/ays
is true but it has been proved often enough to give the
statement considerable weight, lilany people have blamed
the difficulties of the textile industry after the V/orld
War partly to this factor. Most of these companies re-
mained in the same family for years and as long as the
founders or their sons retained control the companies pros-
pered, but the later generations were not driven by the same
necessity of making good. They had an established business.
In most instances the companies were sound financially and
had well trained employees, as well as an established market.
Then came the ./orld i.'sa* with its economic upheavals. Prices
declined in the deflation of 1920 and 1921, and huge inventory
losses had to be charged off, ^Tith the war came changed
methods of living. Styles unden/irent radical changes, in that
the tendency euaong women was to wear less clothing. The
textile companies expanded rapidly during the war. Additional
buildings were erected and plants were geared up to a high pitch.
With the falling off in demand, curtailment became necessary
and a long period of declining earnings vms experienced. Many
old established firms were obliged to shut down, and only those
concerns that manufactured products used in the automobile
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industry were able to show good profits. It may be argued,
of course, that these conditions were not primarily a re-
flection upon the management and this is true in a measure,
but at the sane time the concerns with the best management
were able to overcome these difficulties, while the ones with
poor management failed.
Speculation suid swindles. In the process of business
evolution, many swindles have crept in. Some of the more
famous ones in the days gone by have been cited above. In
the history of this country, no period has had so many swindles
in such huge proportions as in the decade follovring the 7/orld
War, The situation was ripe for just such a development.
The dominant position of United States during and after the
war caused large shipments of gold in payment of the supplies,
ammunition, and money borrov/ed by foreign nations. This
brought about great industrial expansion, and the surplus credit
which was not required to finance business naturally found its
way into securities and speculation. The war keyed the nation
up to a high pitch. Coupled with this factor, the sale of
Liberty Bonds to millions of people v/ho heretofore had had little
or no experience with securities of any kind, caused '.vldespread
interest in stocks and bonds, and proved to be fertile ground for
the sellers of stocks of all kinds. In the years of 1919 and
1920 millions of dollars were poured into mining and oil stocks
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of all descriptions. The large majority of them were
worthless. The famous Ponzi scheme exposed in 1920 caiae
when operations of this sort were at their peak. "Bucket-
shops" also thrived. These concerns operated in the manner
of brokerage firms, making a pretense of buying and selling
securities, but in reality stealing most of the money they
received. One such firm was reported to have conducted a
weekly business totaling several million dollars. Then
came the panic of 1920-1921 and with the deflation these
firms gradually disappeared, but swindles of a miscellaneous
type have continued because people often do not recognize the
difference between speculation and swindle. 7/hen one specu-
lates, he recognizes that there are risks, but has reason to
believe that there is value behind the stocks he buys and a
chance for ultimate profit. In the case of swindles, the
purchaser merely takes the v/ord of the vendor of securities;
has no proof that the stocks are worth anything, and often
finds that they are not.
This inability on the part of many investors to dis-
tinguish bet7/een the quality of stocks, is described by
Owen D. Young, chairman of the General Electric Co., in the
January 31, 1931 issue of Collier's weekly, in which he says
in part: "I thought it would be a fine thing if the in-
dividual could build his ovm estate; it would give him a
feeling of independence, a good thing. ind since I believe
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in the electrical industry and in our ovm company I thought
the soundest method of v7orking toward this objective vrould
be by encouraging our men to buy stock in the company, and
aiding then to do so. And so, shortly after the last
depression (1920-1921) we launched an employees' stock-
purchase program. As I recall it, about 14,000 subscribed
for and finished paying for General Electric stock; and as
prosperity returned and our business flourished, the market
value of that stock virtually doubled and I thought I had
done a fine thing. But what happened? It seemed as if
every v/ild promoter in the country began cainpaigning to get
hold of this stock, exchanging it for gold mines, or worthless
oil stocks, or a share in any project that offered glittering
prospects. Unfortunately, the increase in value of our stock
had given employee stockholders an idea that now they knew how
easily money was made. They listened to what they wished to
hear, and all but about two thousand employee names disappeared
from the stockholders' list, their stock passing into other
hands. And so I learned that my idea wasn't so fine after all.
Because all men are not alike in ability to save, v^e have the
pension system, although the ideal thing would be a condition
in which high wage employees laid aside their own reserves.
All men, it proved, have not like abilities in holding on to
what they have, so we altered our stock-ovmership plan."
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Speculation and gambling. Another element which is
closely associated with speculation is the gambling instinct,
if it may be termed as such. There is nothing nevr in this
phenomenon. It originated with the human race, and it is
just as much a part of the human "equation" as ever. It is
illustrated in card games, race track bets, "pools" of all
kinds and descriptions, lotteries, and last but not least, in
a certain type of stock market operation. The latter type of
gambler buys stocks for the purpose of selling to someone else
at a higher price. He is not interested in values, but depends
upon a rising or falling market to be successful. The more
rapid the movement, the better he likes it, provided he is on
the right side. Naturally, such an individual is a parasite.
He creates nothing, and seeks to profit from excesses. Pro-
fessor Tausig, in "Principles of Economics" says: "The evil
from the situation arises not only or chiefly from the losses
of the unsuccessful speculators. Y/hat these lose, others gain,
and usually there is not much to choose between winners or losers.
The economic loss arises primarily from the waste of much brains
and energy on unproductive doings. The waste is more than that
of the labor given directly, the labor of the brokers and their
under-strappers, and of the speculators themselves. It is in-
creased by the demoralization of many men in the community who
take no great direct share in speculation. Like all gambling.
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it distracts from the sober, continuous work on vrhich the
common welfare rests". One instance v;as reported of a young
dentist, who during the big rise in stocks during the period
from 1924 to 1929, forsook his profession because it was
"Easier to make money in the stock market". Ultimately he
lost all his money and had to go back to work. Another instance
was told to the writer of a salesman who had all his money, about
250,000, in a margin account. Like thousands of others, he v/as
convinced that the "New Era" theory was correct and failed to
liquidate at high prices. As a result he v/as sold out in the
crash. being a man about 65 years old, he could not hope to
build up his surplus to its former figure unless he v/as a man of
extraordinary ability. These are but two among thousands of
similar instances. The stock market gambler, as well as any
other kind of gambler, never vrins in the long run. If he sticks
to it, he is just as sure to lose as he is that the sun will rise.
This necessarily must be so. Gambling in any form is not based
upon fundamentals, but upon chance, and experience has proved that
those who rely upon this principle for livlihood barely break even
at best, over a long period.
Speculation and investment. The difference between the
speculator and the investor is obvious. The latter buys for
value and income. He is not primarily interested in whether his
investment is likely to grow more valuable, but he nevertheless
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tries to gyage his purchases so that he v^ill get them at
the lov/est possible price. The fact that he is an in-
yestor makes this a dominant influence. The shrewdest
people in business or private life are investors. They
kno".v that 90/^ of all speculators lose, and in order to be
successful they must buy v/hen the speculators are selling
and sell when the speculators are buying. The investor
studies carefully the company in v/hich he contemplates
buying stock, ne considers financial condition, earnings,
past record, and most of all, future prospects. He not
only satisfies himself upon all these points, but he gets
the opinion of various experts and bankers upon the subject.
Then, when he is satisfied that the stock, or house, or
commodity, or whatever it may be that he is purchasing is
selling at a fair value, he places his order. In this sense
he is not essentially different from the speculator, except
that the latter buys primarily for improvement in value, vdiile
the investor has income in mind. Frequently it happens, however,
that the purchaser does not know whether he wants to invest or
speculate. He oftens wants safety of income but in his mind
there always is the thought of possible "profit". The person
who places his surplus funds in an enterprise first should know
clearly just what he wishes to do, for a thorough understanding
on this point may mark the difference betiveen success or failure.

-25-
Econornic changes: Business cycles. Econor.iic
developments alv/ays have had a profound influence upon in-
vestments. The industrial revolution, previously mentioned,
•was the beginning of the stock and bond era, '.Tars alv/ays
have a direct effect upon investments. Business cycles con-
stantly are changing the status of securities, because the
attitude of investors axid speculators tov^ard seucrities is
determined largely by earnings, v^ich contract during periods
of depression, and expand during subsequent revivals. According
to one statistician, there have been tvrenty business cycles since
1857 in United states, and the full cycle ranged all the way from
tvrenty-nine months to ninety-nine months.* Prior to 1857 there
were panics in 1818, 1825 and 1837.** Unfortunately there has
been no systematic record kept of the fluctuations in stock prices
prior to the beginning of the present century, but the industrial
stock average compiled by the Dov/-Jones Company reflects faith-
fully the business cycles. For example the peak of the in-
dustrial expansion in 1907 was reached in i-ay, v^-hile the high
point in the "average" for that period occurred in October 1906.
Again, the low point for the subsequent contraction in business
was reached in June, 1908, v/hile close exaPiiination of the "average"
shov/s the lovr point of stock prices occurred in November 1907.
The close ane.logy between business cycles and stock prices is thus
shovm in practically every instance in which statistics are avail-
* See "The Year in Vj'all St. Since the Break", by Eugene 11, Lokey in
Ne'vY York Times, October 26, 1930.
** Principles of Economics Vol.1. p. 400.
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able.
This ?.s brought out very vrell in the Decenber, 1930
monthly review of economic conditions published by the
National City Bank of New York, as follov/s: "We have to
remember in times like these that the influences of de-
pression are cumulative and that it is the usual thin.^; for
the outlook to appear more and more unpromising in inverse
proportion as the depression nears its end. At the first
onset of depression only a fevr lines are apt to be affected.
Gradually as production falls off and purchasing poT^er is
curtailed, other lines are involved. These lines affect
other lines, and so the disturbance spreads. As production
lessens, profits are diminished, causing a decline in security
values which not only inflicts financial loss upon a great
many people, but unsettles confidence, which in turn hurts
business some more and contributes to still greater security
declines. Moreover, with a declining consumptive demand,
commodity prices come under pressure, thus introducing further
and still more serious complications. Since prices never fall
equally, business is checked because of the inability of the
different groups of producers and consumers to trade freely with
each other. And as the price decline continues, the circle of
disturbance grows constantly wider, involving in varying degree
wages, rents, land values, and finally the credit structure
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itself v/hich rests in the last analysis upon the basis
of values.
"In short, the processes of deflation operate in a vicious
circle, each unfavorable development bringing in its train a
series of other unfavorable developraents , each of which in its
turn constitutes a potential source of further difficulty.
But obviously this sort of thing has to corae to an end sometime,
and by the very nature of the circumstances the turn comes at
the time when to most people everything looks the blackest.
Just as the basis of eveiy depression is laid in the pre-
ceding period of prosperty, so the basis of every prosperity is
laid in the preceding period of depression. It is at such
times that we correct the mistakes and remedy the abuses of in-
flation. Costs of doing business are reduced. Surplus stocks
are gradually absorbed and shortages begin to appear. Old debts
are paid and funds for nevi enterprise commence to accumulate.
Gradually the weak spots are eliminated, stabilization develops,
and confidence is restored.
"At precisely v.-^hat point this hoped for stabilization will
take place can never be foretold with certainty. In the begin-
ning, the corrective factors v/ork beneath the surface, and are
often obscured by the more spectacular happenings that usually
mark the culminating phase of either a bull or a bear market,
"Hence, in forming judgment of the future it is necessary
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to make allowance for this hunan tendency to project the
present situation fonmrd in a straight line. Of course,
the fact that a feeling of pessinism prevails in nany
quarters is not in itself a sure indication that the bottom
has been reached, but it may be worth remembering that such
is likely to be one of the characteristics of the bottom
T/hen it is reached. At this stage of every depression vre
have to recognize that the visibility is bound to be low,
and drecvf inspiration from a common sense realization of the
underlying resources and strong recuperative powers of the
country, as demonstrated over and over again in the past,
rather than from any signs of improvement."
Unusual developments. Sudden and unheralded events
alv/ays are reflected in the security markets. The start of
the World War brought such an avalanche of selling into the
stock m.arket that the authorities closed the exchange on
July 31, 1914 and did not reopen for trading until December
12, 1914 and then only in a limited number of stocks under
restrictions. On September 18, 1873 the stock exchange
closed at noon because of the failure of Jay Cooke & Co,
promoters of the Northern Pacific Railroad. The exchange
reopened on September 30, 1875, but between Sept. 18 and the
close of that year there were 57 stock exchange failures.
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besides the closing of the Union Trust Co., the Bonk of the
Commonv/ealth and other financial institutions.* Important
gold discoveries have had a marked influence upon business
and financial conditions. The gold discoveries in California
and Alaska v/ere examples of such events. The effect on credit
is seen in the Annual report of the Director of the Hint for
1918. Production of gold Jumped from !*36,393,000 in the period
from 1841 to 1850, to |132,513,000 in the period from 1851 to
1855. The high point of gold production was reached in 1915
when gold valued at $468,724,918 was produced. The effect of
such developments in recent years has been more noticeable be-
cause of the large increase in number of securities. New in-
ventions, political disturbances, or any incidents of a revolu-
«
tionar^/- character are sure to influence business and the security
market s
•
New forms of enterprise. The changes that are constantly
taking place in business methods also are reflected in the value
of securities. The era since the beginning of the 20th century
has been called "The Machine Age", reflecting as it does the in-
creasing use of machinery in production. Its effect has been
far-reaching, lowering cost of production, increasing output,
and making shorter working hours. This has been particularly
noticeable in the production of autom.obiles . The Ford I'otor
Motor Company, throtigh efficiency of management, and extensive
* New York cstock Exchange Year aook, 1929-1930, Page 14,
•
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use of machinery, has oeen able to place on the market an
automobile that is v/ithin the means of almost every individual.
Other companies have had to fall in line, with the result that
m.ass production is being carried into almost every field of
business where possible.
Investment trtists. *The investment trust idea is not
a nevj- one in England, but in United atates, it did not become
prominent until after the panic of 1920, The movement was
gradual at first, but with the rising stock market in the period
from 1924 to 1929, the tremendous increase in demand for secur-
ities of all description caused more and more of these companies
to be formed. Their effect was to bring into the stock market
a large class of individuals ^'vho were not financially able to
buy a diversified list of stocks, but who had the desire, never-
theless. It vras argued that here was a method by which everyone
could participate in a big rise in securities, and at the same
time have the advantage of expert management. It was argued
that the support of investment trusts in the market would help
stabilize prices and prevent any further severe deflations. The
arguments of the conservatives that credit was becoming strained
vrere called old fashioned. That these people were wrong now is
a matter of history, and was reflected in the fact that during
the subsequent decline, the price of many trust stocks sold far
belovj- their liquidating value. Nevertheless, the investment
* See also Harvard business Review, October 1950, page 78 and 88,
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trust has proTed that it has a place in the security market.
A sound, well managed trust, under proper restriction, is an
ideal form of investment for the person who is not in a
position to keep in touch with economic changes and develop-
ments that might effect a large number of companies. The
safety in such an institution is in the ability of its manage-
ment, and its success or failure largely is dependent upon this
factor,
Ne\7 industries constantly are attracting speculative capital.
The most recent at this vrriting is the airplane industry. These
companies are going through all the tryinp: experiences that all
new industries have in their early years. The time has not yet
arrived v;hen the public demand for airplanes has reached the
proportions that will bring about an excess of new companies and
inflation, but a hint of what may eventually happen in this in-
dustry was noticeable after the successful flight of Colonel
Lindburgh, Host airplane stocks rose several hundred percent
in a few months, but since that time it has become quite apparent
that the public has not yet reached the stage of enthusiasm for
airplanes which will bring about an era of large scale production.
The radio industry previously has been mentioned. That other
new industries will develop as long as the human race endures is
obvious, and that these v/ill be accorded the same kind of a
reception by investors as long as the present economic system
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exists, seems certain.
Effect of credit expansion on speculation. The effect
of the credit supply upon securities is direct insofar as it
applies to those vfho do not pay for their securities in full.
V.Tien credit is plentiful, money rates are cheap, and it is a
comparatively easy niatter to buy stocks on margin. The
"broker requires the customer to pay a given percentage of the
market value of the securities bought, usually 25 to 50% or
more, depending upon business conditions and the kind of
security. The broker is obliged to hold the stocks bought on
margin, so he must either put up the additional money or borrow
from his bank. The total borrowings of brokers and bankers on
securities constitute the so-called "brokers* loans" v/hich are
reported weekly by the Federal Reserve Board. Naturally, when
the credit supply is plentiful borrov;-ing is advantageous for the
person who trades on margin, but when increased activity in
business reduces the amount of credit available, rr.oney rates go
up, or "tighten" to use the language of the financial world.
Then it is disadvantageous for the trader to buy stocks on margin,
for it usually happens that when stock prices are high, yields are
low, and the interest on the loan is greater than the yield on the
stocks purchased.* The outright purchaser of stocks is effected
indirectly by credit conditions. V.Tien credit is easy, and money
rates are cheap, there ultimately materializes an expansion in
* See The .'/ork of the atock Exchange" by Lleeker, Chapter VII, page 175.
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"business. This business expansion results in higher earnings
for most industrial and utility companies, Inasnuch as the
earnings of a company are used as one gauge for determining
the -value of a stock, prices of the stocks rise or fail with
the earnings of the company. In periods of high earnings,
therefore, prices are likely to b e higher than in periods of
adverse earnings. Thus the person who is accustomed to pay
for his securities in full must pay higher prices during times
when earnings are high and credit supply is reduced than when
earnings are low and credit supply anple. It may be argued
that the shrevrd investor does not buy stocks when prices are
high. This argument m^y be true as applied to the investor,
but in periods when earning power of companies is high» there
is a greater amount of surplus money available for investment,
and experience has proved that more stocks are bought at such
times than in the reverse circumstances.
Naturally the gold supply has a profound influence upon
credit. The country with a large gold supply has an abundance
of credit. Should this gold be given unrestricted use in
business, it vrould cause inflation of the most drastic sort.
This was illustrated in the period of expansion from 1918 to
1920, and from 1924 to 1929. Even the influence of the
Federal Reserve Board could not prevent inflation during those
periods, when about half of the gold supply of the v/orld was

-34-
v;-ithin the borders of America. It is estimated that one
dollar of gold is equivalent to about sIlO worth of credit.
When business expansion extends this ratio, the situation
becomes dangerous, and ultimately must result in deflation.
To date there have been no means devised to prevent such
developments. The Federal Reserve Board is able to prevent
too great extremes, through the raising and lopfering of the
rediscount rate, but this agency cannot prevent inflation in
some form and subsequent deflation,
A good deal of comment has been made in recent years in
regard to the diminishing production of gold. *There isn't
enough monetary gold in the world, it is claimjed, and the
increment of new gold is shrinking yearly faster than it ought
to, and the existing gold stock is very badly distributed among
nations, some few having vastly more than they can use, v/hile
others are handicapped for lack of adequate gold holdings.
The gold production of the world, which had climbed from
1100,000,000 yearly in the '80's and $200,000,000 in the «90*s
to a high of $467,000,000 in 1912, has slowly receded to just
under |400,0C0,000 at this writing. Output of United States
has shrunk from a hi^ of $101,000,000 in 1915 to about
145,000,000 a year. In the meantime, the amount of world
business based upon this gold has been growing steadily, with
some countries forsaking the silver for the gold standard.
* Boston News mreau, Nov, 22, 1930,
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Hence, on the quant it ive theory, the conclusion is that
gold base is becoming uncomfortably narrow and that prices
are being and will be unduly depressed. Thus as recently as
September 25, 1830 it was declared by the conference of League
of Nations delegates studying this question, including some
American representatives, that "the supply of new gold available
for monetary purposes will be inadequate by 1934 unless measures
to alleviate the situation are taken in time," On the other
hand some economists declare the gold scarcity argument much
overdrawn. They are inclined rather to blame the costs and
losses of the World "far. It is obvious, however, at this
writing, that there is a serious "maldistribution" of the existing
gold supply. Two nations, America and France, have over 55% of
the total gold supply held by 44 nations. It is this relative
world scarcity and serious dislocation which have led some English
authorities, notably oir Josiah btamp and Lord Dabemon, to fear
something like bankruptcy for some parts of Europe unless the
situation is alleviated.*
So long as gold remains the basis of credit and the foundation
of the money system, prices are measured in terms of gold. Hence,
when the supply of gold increases more rapidly than the supply of
comnodities, other things being equal, prices advance; and v.-hen
the supply of gold declines more rapidly than the supply of commod-
ities, prices decline. The developments in this situation also
* Boston News Bureau, Nov. 22, 1930.
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effect security prices in the sasie ratio.
Unusual aspects of stock speculation. Speculation in
stocks is unusual in that it embraces a much larger field
than other forms of buying for profit. Speculation in commod-
ities is confined to one product. At least an individual who
speculates in wheat may buy other grain futures, but he seldom
buys a large number of commodities at a given time. The stock
speculator, hovrever, is not all niggardly in his choice. He
buys many stocks of vridely spearate interests, if he has the
money, wuite frequently, he is more interested in the price
of the stock and \vhether it is likely to advance in value, than
he is of the nature of the company's business. In fact, it is
T,rell krovm in investment anal^^sis circles that an investor some-
times -will buy a stock and then make inquiries as to the kind of
business he has oought into. No one would question the principle
that diversification is one of the prime requisites to a sound
investment policy, but care should be taken that this policy is
not carried too far. An investment of a few thousand dollars
spread over a large number of stocks would be just as poor judge-
ment as to put all of one's surplus earnings into one speculative
security.
Then too, investors often think of stocks as something in-
tangible. They do not connect the paper they have as something
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representing value. Too often, of course, the stock
certificate does not represent value, "but the holder of a
share of stock issued by a leading industrial, utility, or
railroad company, should realize that the certificate repre-
sents a partial ovmership of the entire conpany. If more
consideration was given to this truth, investors would be
more likely to ascertain v/hether or not a stock was worth
the price before they bou^t it. Those vrho buy land, or
coinmodities , or the essentials of daily life, seldorL buy
v;-ithout at least visualizing the article they are purchasing.
There is no essential difference, fundamental ly, in buying
securities.
The stock broker and his influence upon securities.
The broker is expected to render a service in the constant
exchange of securities. Nevertheless he has considerable
influence upon the fluctuations in the price of securities
under certain conditions. It previously has been stated
that when a speculator or stock trader buys stocks on niargin,
the broker o ithor supplies the difference betrreen the anount
put up by the customer and the total sum necessary to purchase
the stock. The customer must keep his margin "good" at all
times. Consequently^ when stocks go down, the broker "calls''
for more margin to protect his own capital. If the customer
does not pay the sum demanded, the broker has the authority
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to sell the stock to protect himself. In periods of rapidly
declining prices, therefore, the decline is accentuated by
selling of unprotected margin accounts. 7/ithin recent years
there also has materialized a good many devices designed to
protect traders from loss. One of the most corrr^on of these
is the "stop-loss" order, tsy this plan, the customer places
an order to sell his holdings at several points under the prevail-
ing price in order to protect his profit, or limit his loss, as
the case may be. After a sustained rise in the market there is
likely to be a large number of these "stop-loss" orders in the
hands of brokers vraiting to be transacted. In a sudden decline,
these are "touched off" to use the phraseology of the financial
district, and the increase in sales through this mechanical device
also causes sharper declines in various stocks than ordinarily
mJLght be the case. In other ways, the broker influences the
price of stocks through underwriting securities, vrtiereby he often
adds a considerable sum to the amount the financing company receives
to cover cost of underwriting, banking fee, etc. Naturally, the
investor pays for this sei'vice, and if the stock is generously
priced, he often finds that he must wait a considerable time before
the earning power of the com.pany is sufficient to v/arrant the price
paid for the stock. Brokers also frequently render a service to
customers, in which more or less expert advice is given in the
purchase and sale of securities. Too frequently, however, the
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broker and his customers' rnen are nore concerned in the sale
of some issue the firm is underwriting than in the best interests
of the investor. The high grade brokerage firm, hov/ever, renders
an invaluable service to investors and speculators.
The lav/ of supply and demand. This fundamental principle
of trade also is a basic element in the market for securities.
It is responsible for stocks selling at prices greatly in excess
of their true value near the end of a "bull" market, and for a
corresponding underrating of values in a "bear" market. The
demand is largest in the final stages of a "bull market" and least
in the last stages of a "bear market". This was illustrated in
in the period prior to the crash in 1929, Stocks were bid up
regardless of earnings or values. The main reason for buying a
stock was because the purchaser expected it to advance in price.
IThereas in prior years a conservative value for a stock was cal-
culated at about 10 times earnings, it was argued that stocks
were not over-priced at 20 or even 30 times earnings ,r Thus the
frenzy for making a "profit" in stocks resulted in bids being
placed at any price. Now turn to the other side of the picture.
In the decline v/hich started soon after September 3, 1929, and
culminated November 13, 1929, there were times v/liich many shares
were offered for sale but the bids v;ere avray below market value.
As a result prices melted away rapidly. In a fevr instances, it
was reported that there v/ere no bids for certain stocks vriien the
" See Appendix, page 98.
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selling was at its height, particularly sosie of the in-
vestment trust issues v;hich were formed a short \Thile prior
to the break in the niarket, I>jring the long period of
declining prices vrhich began in April 1930, and continued
with a fev; short periods of interruption up to the end of
the year, the supply of stocks nearly always v/as in excess
of the desaand. The speculative element being largely
eliminated, the bids for stocks usually -.vere at some point
below the prevailing market. The investors, therefore,
were willing to take stocks at their own price. In other
words, it 7/as a "buyers" market. Under these conditions,
the tendency was for prices to fall. Those vjho had stocks
for sale frequently were willing to take any price, while
those who wanted to buy could nane their own price. This
always is true in declining market, whether stocks or commod-
ities are being dealt in.*
Selling to establish losses for income tax purposes also
was a factor in the decline, and this vms responsible for a
larger nuriber of siiares being offered in the latter part of
1930 than ordinarily might be the case. Those -.vho were
obliged to pay an income tax could deduct losses from sale of
securities, and the abnormal quantity of such sharss offered,
in the absence of an equal or greater number of bids, gave
impetus to the severe pressure upon prices.
* See also Principles of Economics - Tausig - Chapters 18, page,
23u-251: chapter 22, page 290-309; chapter 31, page
42'7-44*.
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FHSYCHOLOGfy AND ITS RELiiTION TO SECURITY MARKETS.
YJhat is Psychology? Psychology is described as the science
of himan behavior,* The Century dictionary describes it as the
"Science of the phenomena of mind; mental science", and enlarges
upon this definition as follows: "It is said to have orginated
with Pythagoras. Aristotle greatly improved it, and stated its
most important principle, that of the association of ideas. It
has, havever, only recently taken the position of a universally
acknovfledged science; and its methods are still in dispute.
Some psychologists hold that we know the mind by direct intuition
in consciousness; others, distinguishing between consciousness
and self-consciousness, hold that the former involves no recognition
of the mind, while the latter is not an origianl power, but only
acquired knowledge. But, though such inward vision be denied, most
psychologists, still consider the observation of what passes within
us as the main foundation for psychology. Others regard intro-
spection as too deceptive to be of much use, and some deny its
possibility. ——The prevalent school of modern psychologists
attributes great importance to systematic experimentation by one
person upon another, especially to quantitative determinations, as
of the time occupied in different mental processes, the force
required to produce sensations of given intensity, and the like;
yet some of the older generation predict that the utility of this
* Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 22 pages 547 to 304.
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method will be found to have narrov/ IL^nits.''
The Encyclopaedia 3ritannica describes psychology as the
"science of mind" which can only be more strictly defined by an
analysis of vvhat the *mind' means,
* Professor James says the definition of psycholo^ may be best
given in the -.vords of Professor Ladd, as the description and
explanation of sense of eonsciousness as such.
Although the science of psychology has been recognized for
a long time, it is only with the past 75 or 100 years that it has
been organized as such. At the present time there are two schools
of psychology; introspective and behavioristic. The difference
betvreen the tvro is very marked. The first is concerned with
methods which rely upon verbal reports from individuals as to
what is going on in their own mind. The second studies activity,
action, behavior. There are different phases of the science, which
may be divided into the follovring groups: educational, religious,
social, legal, rnedical, business, employment, and psychology of
working conditions. Those which we are primarily interested in
this thesis include business, and possible the lasttwo. business
psychology is the study of the behavior or reaction of individuals
tinder various business conditions. Under this heading we find that
instincts, emotions, individual differences, habits, mental alertness,
environment and training have important functions.
The individual. Not.Yithstanding the often repeated proverb
Psycholosry, "iTillian James, Pa^re 1.
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thst "all men ere oreeted free and equal", psycholof^ists tell
us that while men may be created free they are by no meens equal,
that the inequalities ere due to a number of factors, such as
social, environmeri^ training, heredity, intelligence, etc* It
is well knov/n among financial men that professional people often
are very poor investors and speculators. A good doctor, teacher,
lawyer, or theologan, may rank very high in his chosen profession,
but the fact that he has been intensively trained along special
lines, often makes htm peculiarly susceptible to the vagaries
of the stock exchange and the not too honest people sometimes
connected with the distribution of securities. This does not
always apply to professional people, however. The founder of
a well icnown financial publishing concern nearly always lost
money in the stock market. TThen he went away on a trip, his
secretary
,
who had charge of his investments, would sell a
large part of his holdings, and, when taken to task for so
doing, would say, "Vfell, I thought you would be able to buy
them cheaper", and this invariably would prove to be true.
The matter of training does not necessarily make one a
successful investor although it must be admitted that the
trained man has a much better chpnce, particularly if his
training has been along financial lines. But the early fi-
nanciers, w^ose names have been handed dovm, v/ere often men
who would be termed illiterate at the present time. In fact,
See Tausig, Chapter 54, page 246. Principles of "conomics.
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Henry Clews, in his book "tvrenty-eight Years in VaU Street",
stated th£t he doubted if a college training was desirrble
for 8 financial man. /mother of the early financiers, Coircnodore
Vanderbilt, could see nothing wron^^ v.ith the expression "Kev-r
tell nobody v/hat yer going to do, till you do it", Daniel
Drev/, whose fortune as a stock trader at one time v.as estimated
at ^13,000,000; who started life as a cattle drover, and to
whose ingenuity wrs attributed the term "wstered stock", 8lv;ays
referred to shares of stock as "them sheers".* In fact, the
most successful financiers have been those whose mental alert-
ness have enabled the^ to think just a little sooner than the
majority of other people. But at the sarfe time it is doubtful
if the sarre men v;ho were successful in the early days of American
finance, would be able to successfully cope with the present
highly organized business machinery. The successful financier
of today is perhaps one of the rr.ost highly trained individuals
in the world.
General intelligence .** Differences in intelligence ere
very marked in the attitude of millions of people toward invest-
ments. Intelligence is a factor which has received the greatest
smount of attention among psychologists and is the oldest form
from standpoint of psychological research. As a result a great
many tests have been conducted,
V?hat do we mean by intelligence? There is no agreement
among psychologists as to ^vhat it is, e think vre know what we
mean by a man's intelligence but when we want to define it
Twenty eight years in 'V&ll St, by Henry Clev/s. Page 117-118
** Prof. Chamberlin's Lectures, March 21, 1929.
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there are difficulties because .ve are not able to evaluate the
factors which go to make it up. It consists of a group of
elements. Some think that attention is a most important factor.
Others think judgement is important; or the ability to unite
into a single unit all the experience of daily activity. Still
others think learning ability is the measurement of intelligence.
Professor Ghamberlin says;: "my feeling is that intelligence must
be measured in term^ of the ability an individual has to adapt
himself to the environment in which he is born. You will notice
that this is a social definition of intelligence. Furthermore
it is relative. , The intelligence of the negro in Africa is
relative to race and geographical environment." Intelligence is
not made up of one single factor, therefore, but of a combination
of several.
Assuming that judgement and learning ability are the essen-
tial qualities in measuring intelligence as applied to securities,
what do ^A'e find? The writer's experience is that the average
person uses very little judgement in the choice of securities.
This is sho'ATi in the fact that most people measure their invest-
ments by the size of their pocket-book rather than by the quality
of the investment. Naturally the amount of money one has to
invest is of primary importance, but the majority of investors
prefer to ovm a large number of shares of a cheap stock, than
a few shares of good stock. They apparently feel that there is
a greater chance for improvement among the cheap stocks than

-46-
there is in high priced stocks. The fallacy of this type of
reasoning is shovm by the fact that the price of a stock is
determined by the value behind it and the earning power of a
company, rather than by market quotations.
The intelligence of the large loajority of speculators
also is well illustrated by the constant endeavor to reduce
market movements to a formula. The most common of these are
the charts. It is assumed that the moveraents in an individual
stock or group of stocks are determined by various resistance
points J that is, v/hen the market or an individual stock advances,
the subsequent action will be determined by whether it is able
to maintain its advance. Should the stock decline from the
high and then show the ability to break through the former
high, it is assumed that it is in a strong position and -will
have a further rise. Conversely, a decline is measured in
the same manner. When a stock declines to a lov^ point, and
then rallies, its subsequent movements are determined by its
ability to keep from breaking through the former lov; point.
Should it do so, it is assumed, by the chart theorists, that
it is not able to maintain its price because of technical or
fundamental factors, and this invites further selling. The
fact that a great niimber of people believe in this theory
makes it "workable" up to a certain point, because the con-
certed action of a large number of people -will make a theory
prove truthful to a certain degree, vriiether it is sound or not.
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The fall£.cy of this form of reasoning is proved by the fact
that the chartists seldom make money in the stock mtrket over
e very extended period.
The differences in intelligence also ere noted in the various
groups of investors. In the second paragraph of this section on
intelligence, we assumed that judgement and learning ability
are essential qualities for sound investment reasoning. This
would indicate th-t the investors are the most intelligent.
They buy when other people are selling. They take the stocks
and bonds tliat are offered after a big decline. It must not
be assumed that all people -Who sell at the bottom of a movement
are the least intelligent, hov.'ever. Some sell because they are
obliged to. But it is safe to say that large nxambers of reople
sell when they are not obliged to, because of the influence of
mob psychology and fesr, vdiich will be discussed leter. The
second group are the speculative investors. They have safety in
mind, but they also desire to make a profit, ^^en they notice
that prices are iiTiproving they comrrence buying. By far the
greater group, however, consists of the speculators. Their
only interest is in a desire to make a profit j*- Experience has
shown that most of these do not become interested in stocks
until prices are up 50fc to 75% or more from the lovrs, and in the
final stages of a movement, the buying is of the least intelli-
gent type, consisting of people vrith relatively sriall earning
capacit;/-, and those who are likely to le carried away vrith the
See Appendix, page 105, August 13, 1929, page 115.
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excitenent of the occasion.
The element of learning ability is htrd to gauge in the
stock market. It is reasonable to believe that a large nvinber
of people learn by their mistakes, but often their first ex-
perice is so costly that they do not live long enough to profit
by their prior experiences. But, on the other hand, there are
innvmerable instances whereby investors persist in buying the
seme type of securities as long as their money lasts. The most
common revelations of this sort are in settlement of estates.
Frequently instances are reported whereby investors have put
large sums of money into stocks of the "wildcat" variety;
that is, highly speculative issues, and never have brought
anything else. This type is discernible in the equality of
inquiries received in the financial department of a large met-
ropolitan daily newspaper. Some investors persist in asking
about the possibilities in lov^-priced, highly speculative stocks.
In fact, such people seldom, if ever, inquire about anything else.
But there are evidences that some investors learn by their
experiences in the stock market, and also have the ability to
profit by them. In the period of rapidly declining prices
during October 1929, the writer was in the office of the Boston
Evening Transcript on the evening of the 29th of that month,
which was the most active day in the history of the Jcew York
Stock Exchange, up to the present writing, when 16,410,000
shares changed hands. On that day the "tape" v.as so late in

49-
printing the fin^il transactions that the closing stock editions
of the evening newspapers were not published iintil efter eight
o'clock that night. The offices of the newspapers v/ere cro//ded
with men who were waiting for the "last edition", to see v/hat
their stocks were selling for. The -writer heard one man ask
his neighbor if he had lost anythiag in the crash. The man said
"I was caught in the 1920 crash and learned my lesson then". He
had sold out some time before. This is but one instance, but
ib is sufficient to prove that some men do learn by their ex-
periences and those who are able, profit by them. But the
learning is slow process. Business cycles move slov/ly, and by
the time another upward cycle is at its height, there is a new
group, who have bo learn their lesson, as their fathers did
before them. Then, too, the various cycles differ in their
duration and severity, which is apt to be confusing to many.
In fact, it is the human element in business and the security
markets that makes them so hard to judge.
At what rate does learning take place, is a question which
may logically be asked, end is the rate of learning steady?
Several tests have been conducbed by psychologists to determine
this factor. One of the best known was conducted by Bryant &
Harter.* They used telegraphic language with actual telegraph
operators, and arrived at a sending curve and a receiving curve.
The results sho-.vs that the sending curve was lov/er than the
receiving curve, and the receiving rate finally exceeded the
* Frof. Chamberlin's Lectures Feb. 14,' 1929.
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sending rate. During the test hov/ever, there v/as a period
which formed a sort of level plane in vdiich both curves were
approximately the sar.e, but in the final stages of the test,
the receiving curve shov/ed sherp increase over the other. The
receiving curve, therefore, can be analyzed as more nearly
characteristic of learning ability, and more in line with human
activity- as meesured in stock market movement charts. In all
such charts, as in the receiving curve outlined above, there
approaches a period in v;hich the line does not move either
upv/'ard or dovm7;ard to a very marked degree. This is known
in psychological terms as a pleteau. This plateau is cue to
several factors. *Bryant and Barter conclude thet the pleteau
occurs when the lover order habits have not become sufficiently
automatized to let the higher order habits take place. The
lower order habits develop at the same time but not at quite
the same rate, so that the plateau is probably because of
the lower order of habits not becoming automatized. The plateau
occurs vdien the first interest begins to wane. It may be due
to fatigue, or lack of interest. There is a gradual flattening
of the curve v;hen the psychological limit is approached, but
though Vie iTiay approach the physical limit ve never get to the
point '/.tiere v;e cannot do better.
This leads to the question; csn the plateau be eliminated?
Psychologists conclude that it can be elimin<-tcd if t-vo conditions
are fulfilled: first, if interest is sustained and second; if
Prof. Chamberlin's Lectures, Feb. 7, 1929
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the learning is under control of the le&rner.
The normal learning curve is very noticeable in stock
market activities, although in this instance it may more
properly be termed the curve of interest or attention. Just
as soon as a sudden development becomes known stock prices
take a sharp upv>'ard move iintil it can be determined hovr fav-
orable the development may be. Then a sidevdse movement takes
place, corresponding to the plateau. If the development indi-
cates that the price of the stock has not fully discounted the
event, another rise takes place, rvhich may or may not be more
gradual than the first movement. In a like manner the psychol-
ogical attitude toward securities taken as a v/hole may be ex-
plained. Follovdng a drastic decline in the market due to a
business depression or some other factor, there is a period of
several months in ri-hich prices drag along at a low level. Then
the various barometers of business indicate a turn is imminent.
At this point there is apt to be a sharp upv/ard movement, follov/ed
by a plateau. Then as the situation becomes more rovinded out,
the curve again shov/s a rising tendency. This is more noticeable
in the bond market then in the stock quotations, for the reason
that bond prices are steadier and do not show such v.lde fluctu-
ations. In general, however, the curve is similar in both in-
stances.
Habit and memory .* Our study of psychology tells us that
habit and memory are among the higher mental processes, v.hen
compared vri.th other processes such as sensation, instinct, etc..
* Prof. Chamberlin's Lectures, Feb. 7, 1929.
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and so to a certain extent they are traits more characteristic
of men than other forms of animal life. The importance of habit
has been proved by Professor James. He says that the more we
can reduce our daily activities to a daily plan, the more ef-
ficient we become. Ve rmj ask, therefore, what is habit? Habits
are described as something acquired during the life of the indi-
fidual. They never are born in the individual. No matter hovr
firmly we develop a habit, v/e cannot psss it on, but it is acquired
from learning. In psychological terms, habits are new pathways
in our nervous system for an impulse to pass over. They perform
various functions. They simplify our movements; make our actions
more accurate; decrease conscious attention, and decrease fatigue,
"'.'Ve further learn from our study that habits are formed early,
other things being equal, and that it is important to form good
habits only. "Ye discover that in forming a habit there are
three things to keep in mind: First, mske the first action as
strong as possible; second, repeat it as often as possible; and
third, allow nothing to interfere until the habit is firmly fixed.
Furthermore, habits can be broken in i.hree ways. First by sub-
stitution; second by the tapering off method; and third by com-
plete and abrupt cessation. The last is regarded as the most
desirable.
Memory is similar in some ways to habit. There ere t"WO
general sorts: rote and logical memory. Rote memory, we leam,
should never be used v/hen logical memory is possible. In certain
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instences, hoviever, rote memory is essential, for example,
exact quotations, tables of prices, dates, historical events,
etc. .'.Tien rote memory is used, there ere certain principles
v?hich may be employed to make the learning easier. First, it
it better to learn by v/holes than by psrts. Second, -.we should
distribute our time properly in such memory work. There are
four primary elements associfted with memory. First: primary;
second, recency: third frequency, and fourth vividness. ?-'emo-
ry depends upon several factors; the purpose at the moment;
the educetion of the individual; upon the interest of the indi-
vidual; heredity; and the effective tone; that is ^amount of
mental color there is to the matter at hajid.
Conversely, we are told that forgetting takes piece at
a very definite rate depending upon the amount of effort put
into the original learning.
There are two lev/s of association that ere really secon-
dary. The first is by contiguity or proximity in space and time.
This means that we are lilely to remember things that occur in
the same general area. The second is that we remember things
by similarity and contrast; that is because they are alike or
unlike. Nothing is ever remembered in detail. Some parts are
remembered, some e.re filled in and some my.de up.
The connection between habits and securities is not very
marked, but it is possible that the tendency to reduce human
activities to habits may account for a good deal of the apparent
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lack of reesoning on the part of Itrge numbers of investors.
Mechanical actions have no place in the purchase and sale of
securities. For example, it would be very unwise to form the
habit of buying a stock a certain price under specified con-
ditions regardless of any other factor which might be a domi-
nant influence.
Events in economic and financial history prove that the
memory of most investors is very short. People often remember
the favorable occurrences, but forget the xinfavorable ones.
For example, in December 1930, the financial editor of a large
metropolitan daily newspaper published a stunmary of the news
that was printed during the depression of 1920 to 1921, and
there was a striking similarity between the items at that time
and in the 1929 to 1930 depression. Yet very few investors
remembered the conditions which brought about the panic of
1920, or if they did they refused to recognize that another
depression was in the process of formation.
Instinct. In our study of human activity and its con-
nection with the action of the security markets, we find that
the element of instinct is more deeply rooted. The reason for
this is fundamental. Instincts developed -Arith the human race,
because they were necessary for the welfare of the individual.
There are several classifications of instincts: collecting,
hoarding, rivalry, possession. These developed because of
social relations, in response to the need for social adjust-
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ments. Then there are the instincts of perpetuation of the
races, which ere only a secondary consideration in this dis-
cussion, in that increased population has some influence upon
production.* Undoubtedly most of these instincts culminate
in the action of individuals in the security markets under the
heading of the so-called "hunch", particularly those of hoarding,
rivalry, possession and collecting. They reflect instinct of
self preservation as it concerns the protection of one*s securi-
ties. Very likely, if a large number of individuals could have
been interviewed in the period prior to the big break in the
stock market, or before any business depression they would have
confessed they had a "hunch" that something was going to happen,
but in most cases, the desire for gain overcame the other instincts.
Emotions > That the influence of emotions upon an individual
is likely to effect his judgement in the matter of investments
appears to be borne out by the facts. Human beings have a number
of different sorts of mental experiences, the most elementary of
which are the sensations. They do not come to us singly but with
other sensations. Feelings usually are thought of as complex
compounds of sensations. These are of two sorts, plersant and
unpleasant. Emotions, according to psychologists, are compoxands
of sensations produced by deep seated and profound changes in the
body. The James-Larner theory is probably the best known.** This
theory dates back some thirty or thirty five years and was the
* 5ee Tausig "Principles of Economics", Vo. 2, page 209.
**Prof. Chamberlin's Lectures Nov. 8, 1928.
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product of these two men working simultaneously but sepa-
rately. In considering emotions we have to recognize that
there are tut three principle ones: fear, rage end love, and
that all the others, such as jealousy, sorrow, grief, v.orry,
and sympathy are merely compounds of these emotions. They
are subjective, due to conditions v.-ithin us, and they are
themselves states of consciousness. They are produced by
three kinds of changes that take place in the -ody; in the
blood vessels, in the intestinal muscles, changes in glands
and other complex bodily mechanisms. Th'.se changes stimulate
sensations, and, according to the Ja^es Lamer theory, it is
the compound sensation v.i.ich constitutes the emotion.
",'ihat are the effects of the emotions? Health is probably
the most important. It is vrell known fact th?t persons who
are constantly worried lose weight. Conversely people who
are in a happy frame of mind gain weight. The man who troubled
about his business and financial affairs finds that he cannot
sleep wellj his digestive organs do not function properly, end
this in turr. brings about a general run-dovm condition, if con-
tinued over a v^sry long period. Of all the emotions, or com-
pounds of emotions which Lre directly noticeable in the atti-
tude of people toward the markets for securities, fear is one
of the most influential. To this factor may be traced the du-
ration of most business depressions. People begin to wonder if
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their jobs are safe. They do not buy as much as formerly, and
commence hoarding their savings. This is discemable in the in-
creased savings at the bottom of a depression. To this influence
also is attribut'ed the fact that only a small percentage of
investors buy securities at the proper time. V.lien stocks are the
cheapest, conditions have the worst appearance, and vihen stocks
are high conditions appear best. Thomas Gibson, a well known
economist and student of finance, indicates the following con-
ditions as preceding a major decline in security prices: ' High
and rising prices of securities, accompanied by heavy general
business; expanded credit conditions, showing the full' or over-
employment of money; high rates for call and time money; large
net earnings of railroad and industrial corporations together
with increased dividends and extra distributions; low rate of
return on money invested; large transactions in securities,
with public excitement end enthusiasm; a v.dde and active range
of security prices with alternate sharp declines and rapid re-
coveries. This, 'he states,'' is the final period of manipulation,
during -wdiich the public is kept interested and insiders are
unloading," The conditions preceding e major advance, he describes
as follows: low and usually moderately declining security prices,
accompanied by much irregularity in the price movements of
specific stocks; general business dull; sound or easy credit
conditions and low rates for call and time funds; lo'-v railroad
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and industrial earnings, some decreased dividends, receiverships
and reorganizations; high rate of return or money invested; small
transactions in securities, very little outside speculation; a
narrow and irregular stock market, with a considerable period
of backing and filling, public apathetic end traders bearish.
In such times, Krr^ Gibson states, farsighted interests take
all offerings. There is no logical source for explaining these
phenomena than the influence of the emotions upon individuals
during times of stress and exiliration. The corner grocery
store still does business at the same old stand. There is just
as much money available, the basic institutions of government
and industry are just £S sound. But because of fear, worry and
the other elements which make up the emotions, industrial activ-
ity slows up, and confidence is not restored until the constant
working of economic laws corrects the excesses, and business
again is placed upon a solid foxmdation.
Just as pessimism is the offspring of fear, so optimism
is an offspring of hope. Opinions often are based upon hope
rather than reasoning. This particularly is true of the man
who is holding any article at a loss, no matter what it is.
He is more likely to be influenced by his desires than his
reasoning. This has created the saying that "The v/ish is
father to the thought".* Under normal conditions the majority
of people are optimistic, however. There is more of a tendency
to buy securities for a rise, than to sell short. This is
See "Truth of the Stock Tape" by "'.G.Gann, page 16

natural. Most individuals constantly ere looking for better
things. Everyone has his dream of the future, and, if he is
normal, the dream is optimistic. Hence, nearly everyone makes
plans for the future, end these plans always are on the con-
structive side. This also is borne out by the fact that the
upward trend of a business cycle is longer than the subsequent
decline, with few exceptions. The expansion in the 1907-1908
cycle took 33 months, and the corresponding contraction 13
months. The 1918-1919 expansion took 44 months, while the
corresponding contraction was eight months. In the cycles
since 1857, 11 have had a longer period of expansion than
contraction. Two had the same number of months in the ex-
pansion as in contraction and five had a longer period of
contraction than expansion. This indicates that the elements
of fear and pessimism spread more rapidly than optimism;
that while hope is ever present, fear is caused by a com-
bination of circumstances, and is eliminated as soon as the
basis for the emotion is dispelled. This tendency also is
noticeable in the predictions of the leading business inter-
ests at the beginning of a new year. This may be attributed
to the fact that at such times men hesitate making discour-
aging statements, because of the effect^^ may have upon
ccaaditions, but at the same time, it also may be due in part
to the unconscious desire on the part of most people to look
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on the bright side of things.
Crowd or mob psychology
. The tendency toward crowd psy-
chology has become more marked since the development in methods
of coinmiinication in recent years. In the early history of this
country communication 'ms very slow, and events did not become
known in various sections of the country until several v.'eeks
after they occured. The development of the telegraph, the
telephone and more recently the radio, has greatly speeded up
the dissimulation of news. These factors have resulted in an
increase in action by large n\xmber of individuals at a given
time. It is first necessary to distinguish between crowd and
mob psychology, however. A crowd is described in psycholog-
ical terms as a group of people not within one area. They are
separated geographically. By a mob is meant people within a
given area. In a mob the sense of self is decreased, and the
emotions may spread very rapidly because of the close physical
contact. It experiences a narrowing of the field of conscious-
ness and an expulsion of outside impressions. It is dominated
by a central purpose. It usually is possible to tell when a
mob is in the process of formation. There is a tendency for
people to hold their breath. Everything is quiet and it is
possible to hear the proverbial "pin" drop. This character-
istic is not limited to any one group of individuals. An ex-
perienced group of people may easily be turned into a mob,
because the influences which prevail at such times lessen
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reasoning power. Some people ere able to withstand the excite-
ment of such occasions, however. There ere tvfo kinds y^io ere
less likely to be drawn into them. First ere the intelligent.
They are able to criticize the suggestion end appraise it.
The ignorant are the mercy of the leader of the mob. The
second are the fanatical or impatient people.
Feelings run through a crowd quicker than ideas do. The
person with the loud voice and big physique is apt to attract
attention regardless whether his proposals are sensible or
not. The mob leader, therefore, is important because people
follow him as sheep follow a bell. He is a tremendous source
of potential damage if the aim is an linworthy one. If the
leader is a bad individual the results v/ill be bad. One saving
factor of the mob hov/ever, is that it cannot last long unless
it is being constantly augmented by others. The reason is
because its attention leads to fatigue. A mob has a number
of characteristics. It is prejudiced, irrational, simple
minded and almost single mined ,and unmoral.
The characteristics of both the crowd and the mob are
discernible in follovdng styles in the clothing, smoking,
attitude of ettendents at foot ball and base ball games,
land booms, prize fights end the stock market. There is a
constant desire for leadership. Someone sets the styles and
everyone wears their clothes in accordance with the prescribed
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pattern. Anyone who tries to be origin&l is looked upon bs
fanactic. In boxing matches there is an unreasoning favori-
tism toward one of the combatants, usually the one who is
believed to have the less chance to win. At football games,
the crowd is carried av/ay by a sudden feat of skilly or if
the favorite team scores en unexpected point or v'ins a close
victory. The same tendencies are recognizable in the security
markets. A v.'ell-known stock market "plunger" is sure to have
a large following if his activities become known, or if he
makes an encouraging statement regarding some particular stock.
In the same manner, a big bresk in the market causes most
investors to throw" over their holdings for whatever price
they will bring, in a desire to "get out from under". To
this factor is attributed the well-known truth thet price
declines always go too far. It is more noticeable in a de-
cline than diiring a rising market because the tendency to^^^rd
crowd psychology is more marked at such times. Rising prices
are more orderly and more leisurely developed. People ere
in a happy and serene frame of mind if they are making money,
but the minute the market turns against them, all the emotions
and instincts v;hich have been in the process of formation since
the human race began are brought into play. "".Then this happens,
the fury of the mob becomes evident and many are hurt in the
results . V Two good illustrations of the effect of mob violence
See Appendix., page 108, Oct. 24,1929
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in the past half century v;ere the police strike in Boston in
191S; and the Iroquois Theatre fire in Chicago some 30 years
ago. The latter is perhaps the better illustration of the
two, for people were trampled to death by the scores in a
frenzied desire of the mob to get out. The 1S29 stock market
crash revealed the seme frame of mind, only fortunes v/ere
wrecked rather than lives.
Morale » There comes a time in all business and financial
cycles v/fcen the cro-z/d becomes almost if not completelj' demoral-
ized. It is important therefore, to learn what constitutes
morale. It may be defined as the mental condition of the indi-
vidual or individuals, "'.'hen this is satisfactory, morale is
said to be high or good, end when mental condition is unsatis-
factory, we say that morale is poor or low. The tern often is
improperly used in public conversation for it is frequently
given the meaning of only satisfactory mental condition.
Thorndyke has listed what he thinks are original tendencies.*
They are called the laws of readiness and unreadiness. The
first is 8s follows: If a nervous pathway is set for a par-
ticular action, it satisfies us when we carry out that action
without any hindrance. In other vvords, it pleases us to do
what we want to do. The second is that if a nervous pathway
is set or ready for a particular action and it is not able to
complete it, we have a resulting feeling of annoj-ance. The
third is that if a conditioned unit is not set for a particular
* Prof. Charaberlin's Lectures, March 7, 1S28.
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action, to be forced to carry it out is dissatisfying. It is
unsatisfying to do what we do not want to do. There ere certain
conditions which lead to high morale and certain conditions
which lead to low morale. The first are external to the indi-
vidual, and the second are subjective conditions, ^fe must recog-
nize, however, that external conditions become factors in morale
only when they are transferred into subjective conditions. In
the first group the external conditons we should put such things
as lighting, or illumination, ventilation, heating, rest rooms,
recreational facilities and social enviroment. Under the subject-
ive conditions we may have such factors as happiness, a shore in
the business, satisfactory leadership, opportunity for advance-
ment, fair living wages, educational opportunities, health and
its implications, etc. '.'Thile these factors have no direct
bearing upon the psychological ettitude of the investor, they
are important insofar as they effect his judgement and aid him
in making wise choices. The conditions which lead to a state
of high morale among investors are steady or rising prices.
Morale is highest at the end of a "bull" market, and lowest
at the bottom of a "bear" market, or, in fact, any development
of the "boom" variety. There is a good deal of satisfaction
in buying a stock or bond or anything else and be able to
sell it in a few hours or days for a higher price. There like-
wise is a depressing influence in having one's property decline
in price from the original cost. The cycles in business and
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the stock merket then, must be defined as something inherent
in hvunan nature. This is demonstrated in the fact that sta-
tistics show activity is highest at the top of a rising cycle,
and lowest at the bottom of a declining movement. During the
year 1929 there were over a billion shares bought and sold
on the New York Stock Exchange, and the market value of all
securities reaches its highest figure during that period,
amounting to ;.89,668,276,874, In the following year, the
total value of securities dropped to $49,019,878,459, and the
total number of shares exchanged was around 800, million. Had
it not been for the fact that there were more new shares of
stock put out in the period fromi 1924 to 1928 than in any
previous period, thereby creating a wider distribution, the
nvmber of shares dealt in on the exchange in 1930 undoubtedly
would have been considerably less.
Very few people seem to be able to v>/ithstand a drastic
decline in the price of the stocks they are holding. The men-
tal strain is severe. T/hen one h«?s worked hard to build up
a surplus, it is demoralizing to see this capital shrink daily
without know^ing vfhen the decline will stop. One has to go
through such a situation in order to experience the sensations.
It is like goirg into a battle. One may think hovi he might
act under fire, but he never knows until he has been there.
It is the same in a market crash. The investor cannot say
whether or not he v.'ill hold courageously to his stocks in the
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face of demoralized msrket until he actually hes been in such
a position.
Suggestion. The Century dictionary described suggestion
as follov/s: "the action of an idea in bringing another idea to
mind, either through the force of association or by virtue of
the natural connection of the idess. Specifically in h^rpno-
tism, the insinuation of a belief or impulse into the mind of
the subject by any means, as by words or gestures, usually by
emphatic declaration} also, the impulse of trust and submission
which leads to t?ie effectiveness of such incitement; also the
idea so suggested". The American Journal of Psychology is
quoted as saying that "Suggestion appears to be entirely a
phenomenon of unconscious m.emory" . Hamilton, Reid's T'orks
are quoted as follows: "Let it not be supposed thr^t the terms
suggest and suggestion are, in their psychological rel&tion,
of recent or even modern, applicstionj for so applied, they
are old, the oldest vire possess. In this relative signification,
suggero, the v^^rb, ascends to Cicero; and suggestio, the noun,
is a household expression of Tertullian and St. Augustine."
The most com^ron view of sug;;;;estion is that it is character-
istic of all normal people.* Zvery one is suggestible. Someti'r.es,
however, a person is r.ore suggestible than at ether times. Prof.
Chamberlin says that if we define suggestion in the terms of
normal people, we may say it is the communication of any propo-
sition from one person or person to another in such a \vB.y as
Prof. Ghamberlin's Lectures, Feb. 28, 1929.
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to secure its acceptance with conviction in the pbsenoe of
adequate logical grounds* This leads to the question: •".'hat
are the conditons that favor the operation of suggestion in
normal minds? The answer is: first, those conditions that
are found in the subject himself; and second, those that are
fovuad in the sources from which the suggestion comes. People
often are suggestible because of leek of knowledge or because
of a firmly fixed belief about a thing. The highly trained
mind is relatively unsuggestible; first, because it has a
large store of kno"Pledge and belief; and second; because the
knowledge is systematically organized. Young people, savages
and unintelligent people are extremely suggestible. A person
is not equally suggestible at all times, the least so when
wide-awake and alert, end the most so when fatigued or in
poor physical condition. Emotional disturbances favor sugges-
tibility. This was particularly noticeable in the "orld Y'ar.
Kot much effort w&s required to v/ork a crowd up into a high
state of excitement. People are always more suggestible in
times of high nervous tension. This was noticeable in the
summer of 1929, when millions were "pleying the stock market ,
Rumors of the wildest sort were received with convict ion, -iiln
April 1929, a traveling salesman, who mingled with all sorts
of people, told the writer some of the rumors he had heard.
General Motors, he hed been told, was going to $1000 a share^
American Can $2000 and other stocks were going up in like
V See Appendix, pagelOS, Aug .1,1929, Aug. 7,1929, Aug. 16, 1929
Sept. 16,1929.

68-
manner. He did not seem to question the possibility that they
might not. This is but one example of the power of suggestion
during a great upv-^erd moven.ent in stocks. •«• On the other side
of the picture, wild rumors of pending disaster are circulated
during the last stages of a "bear" market, and are accepted by
those ^vho have worked themselves into a frame of mind to believe
anything.
A group of people, of course, are more suggestive in pro-
ducing results then a sirgle person. The Isrger the group, the
more the influence. The ihTiters of tipster sheets, end those
who circulate false riomors capitalize these tendencies. They
knov; that during times of rapidly advancing stock prices, it
is easier to sell stocks of little value, because people are
highly suggestible at such times, and believe almost anything,
especially if it is in printed form. Mass suggestion, therefore,
is most effective. Promoters know that if they can get a large
number of people to act as they wish them to, their propostion
vdll be more successful, st least so far as they ere concerned,
than if they sold the stock individually to a few people. Some
exam.ples of mass suggestion in the ten years from 1920 to 1930
were the Ponzi Scheme, the Florida Land Boom end the "Coolidge"
bull market. The South Sea Bubble ivas one of the old svlndles
which relied upon mass suggestion for its success.
Auto or self suggestion denotes a mental process which pro-
duces in the m.inds of m^ny people a condition that is not warranted
K>See Appendix, pages 100 to 116.
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by any grounds at all. The subject and the agent sre the seme.
This is noticeable among investors v.'ho form a conclusion and
then ask the opinion of someone else. If the opinion of the
other party agrees with theirs, all is well. If not, they will
argue and sometimes get angry if the other party persists in
disagreeing with them.
Practically everyone is influenced by suggestion at some
time or other, psychologists tell us, and about 90^ of all people
can be hypnotized.* Included in the lOfo who are not hipnotiz-
able are idiots and feeble minded persons. The nxamber of people,
therefore, who sre not susceptible to suggestion are relatively
small. Applying this principle to the great mess of suggestion
experienced in the market for securities, it is easy to compre-
hend hov^ the great majority of individuals who do not understand
this truth may be led astray by wild rumors during periods of
excitement.
Pool operators realize the power of suggestion and lay their
plans accordingly. A pool, in financial terminology, is an asso-
ciation of individuals, each of ?rhom subscribes a sum of money,
for the purpose of operating in certain securities. In other
words, they buy stocks, end through adroit manipulation eucceed
in attracting public interest in them. ^'Ihen the stocks have ad-
vanced to the point agreed upon, the pool sells its holdings and
divides the profit. Hov/ do they succeed in attracting a public
interest in the stock? Simply by using the timeworn power of
* Prof. Chamber lin's Lectures, Feb. 28, 1929.
See Appendix, pag3lC5, Aug. 1,1929
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suggestion. They know that the most powerful attraction to a
stock is an advancing price. They also knov; that investors
are not attracted to stocks in large numbers until they have
had a substantial advance. Therefore, in order to accumulate
a large number of shares, they must first depress the stock
to get the nervous holders to sell. Then, when they have
acquired the number of shares agreed upon, they start bidding
it up, and frequently circulate favorable statements regarding
the outlook for the company or companies in v/hich they are
interested. Usually, the statements have a considerable degree
of truth, as the best organized pool chooses stocks in vrhich the
prospects are favorable, but in certain stages or a rising market,
it is to be feared thst many of the statements are very ques-
tionable if not dovviaright falsehoods. But, -whether true or
false, they serve their purpose.
Price changes due in part to individual difference . Te have
found, in our study of "intelligence", that differences in indi-
viduals are due to a nvunber of factors, such as social conditions,
environment, ege, sex, maturity, etc. Furthermore, if we took
any one trait and measured it with a sufficiently large number
of individuals, vre would arrive at what is known ts a normal
curve of distribution, or a line resembling an inverted bowl.
This factor, therefore, involves mental efficiency, -.vhich is
approached in a niomber of different ways as a basis for study.
There is a difference of opinion, slso, as to what factors are
See Appendix, page 105, Aug. 1,1929.
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the dominant ones. First let us consider the social point of
viev/, Threadbolt maintains that mental efficiency depends
upon the environment in which an individual is born. For in-
stance, a person in the heart of Africa is entirely different
from one in America in his mental outlook upon life. The biol-
ogical point of view considers family history. Pathological
point of view refers to the science of diseases and the effect
these have upon mental growth. This view is more or less op-
posed to the psychological doctrine which is more interested
in the behavior of an individual than the cause. The anthro-
pological point of view classifies individuals according to
their mental efficiency and in this classification it is found
that some feeble minded peocle are partly in the nonual curve
of distribution. Idiots, imbeciles and morons are divided into
three types, low, middles and high. Many high morons are found
in industrial life, and inasmuch as some of them are able to
accumulate surplus funds, it is reasonable to assume that this
type of individual frequently endeavors to increase his capital
through the medium of the stock market. The glandular point
of view deals with the ductless glands. The psychological point
of view places the emphasis upon the behavior of individuels.
Finally, we have the quantative point of view, which includes
the Malthusian theory. Malthus maintained that the cause of
low wages and of poverty lay in the large numbers of mankind»
that there was a tendency of population to press upon subsis-
tence and keep wages low; that a rise in wages could not take
* Prof. Chamber 1 in 's Lectures, Karch 14, 1929.
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place unless the tendency to increase among the laboring classeB
vras checked,*
''.'hatever the cause nay be, it is an undisputed truth that
no two people ere alike. It also is true that differences be-
come more marked as people grow older. Children who play to-
gether every day &nd are in the same neighborhood all the time
have a great deel in common xmtil they go into businoss, or
profession. Then they are subject to different influences.
These tend to chejige them and often some little event in a
person's life v.dll change his v.'hole career. Then too, each
individual has a dual personality. One is the personality that
the friends and acquaintances see and recognize. The other is
one's inner consciousness. One can never tell exactly vAiat is
going on in another person's mind. In other words, it is im-
possible to tell what the other fellov^ is thinking about.
People who live in separate sections of the same country usu-
ally have different ideas. One section may advance more rap-
idly than others, due to the locality being more important
from a trade standpoint; having been settled earlier, or beir.g
endowed with better natural resources. These differences even
are recognized in the speech of the individual, A person v/ho
is born and brought up in New York, has a manner of talking
that is entirely different from the Vesterner or Southerner.
Besides these obvious differences, psychological tests
and scales have been developed to measure the individual dif-
ferences. First is the test of special abilities, either
*i Principles of Economics, Tausig, Vol, II, -age 2C9

inherited or acquired. Included in this test is the measure-
ment of single specific traits, sensory acuity of keenmess,
higher mental processes, motor co-ordination enri personality
traits. Vocational and trade tests also are included in this
classification. Second are the general intelligence or mental
alertness tests. These are divided into two classifications,
individual and group, and each classification is separate es
to literate and illiterate individuals. Third ere the perso-
nality rating scales, ^.vhich include self-rating and concensus
of opinion. These tests prove conclusively that in any
group of individuals, there is a ^.dde range of differences
in the special traits and higher mental processes, the latter
referring to memory, reasoning and judgement. The results
vriien placed in chart or graph form, make a cone shaped line
called the norm.al curve of distritution. If there viere no
differences the line would be straight. Some of the tests
that have been conducted to determine individual differences
are Knox cube test; Truman Lee Kelly's material test, the
Stenquist test, Ruediger puzzle box^ Dr. Colvin's intelli-
gence test, Downey profile test. General intelligence tests
include the Stanford University examination. Army performance
scale. Army Alpha scale end the Army Beta scale.
7{hen all these variations in the human elements are con-
siders, it is apparent that fluctuations in the stock market
and in other organized markets are caused in large measure
by the differences in individuals. The alert individual viho
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has money to invest v/ould. be quicker to recognize and to take
advantage of developments in trsde and economic conditions,
while his less fortunate brother v/ould wait until there was
more visible evidence of improvement. Even though the alert
individual \^fas not trained along financial lines, he v/ould back
up lack of knowledge by consulting someone of wide experience
in such matters.
On the other hand, an investor might be alert, intelli-
gent and have excellent reasoning povrers, but if he did not
have sufficient aggresi;iveness to carry out his plans, he
would lose his opport\mity. A good deal of courage is neces-
sary to buy securities -Aiien everyone is pessimistic and there
are wild rumors of pending disaster. Nevertheless, experience
has shovm that the keenest financiers and business men buy
securities at just such times, and these men are the ones who
make the real money in the stock market.
It may be argued, of course, that market fluctuations
s onetimes are due to other causes than individual differences.
This is true to a certain extent, but it must be realized that
all human activity is influenced by this factor, so in the
last analysis, about the only events thet cannot be traced to
the human element are the accidents of nature, such ts earth-
quakes, floods, tornadoes, plagues, etc. Certainly wars, eco-
nomic developments, tr; de depressions, etc., are traceable to
the activities of individuals in a Icrge measure, end the dif-
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fererraes in humeri nature are chiefly responsible for these devel-
opment s
.
Attention, interest and
-.Till .* These factors should be
considered together, for Fttention and interest are merely syn-
onymous terms and represent only the different points of view
between exactly the same quesbions. There is no necessity of
proving that there is such a thing as attention. Attentive
stetes are continuous and follov.- one from the other without
any break, but the stream of consciousness has valleys end
peaks and if continued far enough will have level places. In
these conscious states that v^hich is at the high point, repre-
sents the focus of eonsciousness, and any outlying hillsides
represent the fringe of consciousness. "'>''e may have a focus
and a fringe of consciousness at any particular moment. Atten-
tion which is represented by a perfectly straight line can
only be gotten by fanaticism or hypnosis; probably never in
normal states. The position of "no attention" probably does
not exist at all. Some think that in sleep there is no atten-
tion, but it is better to think that attention is present
during sleep but at a fixed plane. V.e never have such a thing
as inattention. The question arises, hov/ever, as to how many
things we may pay attention to at the same time. It is prob-
able that we may be attentive to but one thing at a time, "'liere
we appear to be giving attention to more than one thing we
really have rapidly changing ettention.
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There are several kinds of attention. First is involvm-
tary attention, which takes place v/hile the mind is passive.
In fact, it sometimes is called passive attention. The second
is voluntary or active attention. This is required ^rihen it
is necessary for us to m£.ke a choice. The third is similar
to the first, namely secondary passive attention, which is
the kind we give to acquired interests.
Attention as applied to the stock market is seldom
passive. It may be secondary passive on the part of people
who "take a flyer" in the stock marJcet, and by those people who
vrgtch the stock msrket reports from day to day tn determine
whether their securities are going up or down. The active
attenlfcion is given by the professional traders, brokers, and
those othermse interested in the market.
The hills and valleys of attention may be responsible
in part to the curves of market fluctuations. It is highest
at the top of a market rise, and lowest at the bottom.
This is also indicated by the fact that more people are inter-
ested in stocks at t: e top of a move and less at the bottoin.-K
The fact that we are not able to give attention to a great
many incidents at the same time is one reason why an investor
should not have too many securities to look after.
See Appendix, page 108.
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OTHER EF?£CT3 OF THE HUllAI'I ELHvIEMT UPOIJ oECURITiaS
.
One effect of the psychological element upon securities
is reflected in the volume of transactions. In the early life
of the New York Stock Exchange the number of shares bought and
sold v/as -very small, the lowest volume in the history of the
exchange being 31 shares on Mar. 16, 1330.* vfith the growth
of the country and the increase in the corporate form of
business more shares were placed on the market, but volume did
not assume large proportions until the bull market that culmi-
nated in 1929. In certain stages of a rising market, usually
near the end, voliome is largest, and this also is true in a
declining market. Volume tends to increase as the climactic
stage approaches. Students of the stock market characterize
such periods in a decline as "clean up" day. By this they
mean that such factors as marginal selling, professional, or
short selling and liquidation by fri^tened holders has reached
the peak. After this there is a period of calm, like the
aftermath of a severe storm.
Classes of stocks. The character of various stocks
determine the effect that psychology may have upon them during
period vrhen this element is the dominant factor. Sound stocks
are not influenced as much as the more speculative issues, but
in the final stages of a decline, v/hen fear becomes widespread.
* New York Stock Exchange Year Book - 1929-1930, Page 14
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the good stocks are thrown over with the poor ones. Pre-
ferred stocks of the strongest companies occupy a position
comparable v/ith a bond in that they are not subject to wide
fluctuations because of the fixed dividend. The preferred
stocks of the weaker companies, however, are apt to be sold
as freely as the speculative common stocks in a period of
general liquidation. Furthermore, in recent years there
has developed a more common use of the conversion feature
in stock issues. The demand for common stocks in the past
decade made the marketability of the fixed income issues
negligible. Consequently, in order to nalce such stocks
jattractive, they were made convertible into the common stocks.
In some instances stock purchase warrants were attached.
These issues were bid up v/ith other equity stocks in the
speculative era which culminated in September 1929, and had
a corresponding drop in the subsequent deflation. One of the
many examples of this development was liidland Steel Products
participating preferred stock which sold as high as $321 a
share in 1929 and subsequently fell to 135. On the other
hand, the preferred stocks of the sound industrial and utility
companies fluctuated in a relatively narro'.v range. United
States Steel Corporation preferred, for example, sold as high
as 151^ in 1930 as compared with a low of 137 in 1929.
Following a deflation, the pendulum is apt to svj-ing the other
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way» Fixed income securities become more popular.
Safety of principal is given greater consideration. As a
result the bond market becomes stronger, increased demand
causes higher prices for this type of security. First the
hi^est grade issues rise; then as the yields on these
securities grows smaller, investors turn their attention to
the second grade bonds. Then the speculative bonds attract
attention together -//ith preferred stocks. In the final
stage attention again is turned to equities; that is, comnon
stocks. This constitutes the so-called "vicious circle" in
the investment ivorld. Its action is continuous, and is a
result of the psychological factors previously outlined.
Another factor T\diich is likely to influence the attitude
of the investor is the kind of industry a stock represents,
A business y^hich has a stable earning power and is of an
essential nature, commands more of an investment rating than
a new or hazardous business. The soundest industrial companies,
such as the leading steel, food, chexaical, automobile and other
firms manufacturing or producing the necessities of life are less
hazardous than most oil stocks. On the other hand, economic con-
ditions may cause some of these stocks to become speculative, at
least for a time. The textile stocks, previously referred to,
are striking illustrations of this point. American Tfoolen
Company preferred and comnon stocks '.rere at one time considered
good investments, but during the period following the >Vorld .Tfiir
these shares declined to the point that they were considered un-
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desirable even for speculators. The majority of the other
textile stocks were in about the same position. The rail-
road stocks occupied a similar position during and following
the period of government control. The New Haven Railroad,
for example, was in such an uncertain condition at one time
that the common stock sold as low as |9 a share, and there
was talk of a receivership. Host of the other railroad
shares sold at exceedingly low prices, •
The public utility companies have enjoyed a greater
degree of stability than many other groups because of their
steady earning power, but even here the human element has
wrought some startling situations. Professor T/'illiam Z,
Ripley in his book, "Main Street and ?J'all Street", mentions
some flagrant cases of overcapitalization, mismanagement,
and improper distribution of properties among public utility
companies, -j:- These factors are influential in the prices the
stocks of these concerns may command, An overcapitalized
company cannot show large earning power on its securities.
Its funded debt may be excessive, or its total capitalization
may be so large that stockholders are obliged to vrait many
years before they can realize anything on their investment,
Kismanagernent will ruin any company, and a utility company
that has part of its property in New England, more in the
Southvrest and other units in the Philippine Islands or some
-"•Main Street and "/all Street, '.Tilliam 2. Hipley,
page 276, chapter 10,
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other remote place, can hardly have close co-ordination in
in its operations.
Mining and oil stocks are about the nost hazardous of
all groups. The reason is obvious. Their value is dependent
upon the acount of oil or ore they are able to extract from the
ground. This is an uncertain quantity at best, despite the
fact that modem engineering methods have enabled them to gauge
fairly accurately the amount of these commodities in a given
section. Furthermore, investors seldom take into consideration
the fact that laost oil and mining companies are liquidating
propositions. Every pound of ore or gallon of oil taken out of
the ground, reduces by that much the remaining assets, and
eventually there comes a time vrtien new sources of supply must be
found or the company must cease operating. Some mining companies,
like Anaconda Copper I'ining Co. and American Smelting & Refining
Co. have a manufacturing subsidiary, so they are more in the nature
of industrial concerns than rdning companies. Furthermore, some
oil companies, like Standard Oil Company of T,ew Jersey, have
widelj?- diversified interests. On the whole, however, oil and
mining companies have a distinctly limited and uncertain life.
Indexes, -ji It previously has been mentioned that invesrors
endeavor to gauge stock market movement throu^ certain yard-
stick methods, of which charts are the most common. There cjre,
however, certain barometers that gauge quite accurately the hur^n
See Appendix.
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activities in business and finance. Prices and production
of all the basic industries are follovred closely. The
unfilled tonnage statement of the United States Steel
Corporation, published at the end of every month indicates
the trend of steel operations. The Dov^-Jones Company,
publishers of the T/all Street Journal, Boston Nev/s Bureau
and other publications, compiles the percent8.ge of steel
operations vreekly as compared v;-ith a theoretical capacity.
Pig iron 8.nd scrap steel prices indicate increase or decrease
in demand for steel products. Railroad car loadings measure
the volume of goods being moved. Bank clearings are an index
to the state of credit and volume of business being transacted.
Increased activity means a larger amount of business. Foreign
trade figures published monthly by the United States Department
of Commerce shov/ the extent of contaerce vfith other coimtries.
There are several commodity price index numbers, the ones
most commonly used being those con-ipiled Dy Dun, Bradstreet,
The United States Department of Labor bureau of Labor Statis-
tics, and Professor Fisher* s Weekly Index of THiolesale Com^
modity prices. These index numbers measure the trend of bus-
iness activity. The Anabist's index of industrial production
also indicates the trend of business.
Aatomobile production figures have becom.e important in
determining business conditions because of the widespread
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influence of this industry upon other lines of business,
A total production of 5,000,000 units a year naturally
would indicate more active business than half that amount.
Increase or decrease in total building permits and
contracts a'warded is another factor to guide the business
nian or investor in determining the trend of business and
stock prices. Developments in the farm industry have con-
siderable importance. Higjh prices for farm products mean
increased purchasing power for a large number of people,
other factors being equal, and lov/ prices have a reverse
influence. Retail store sales are an indication of the
rate of consumption. The groivth of chain stores in recent
years also has become a barometer of retrail trade conditions.
Money rates folloTv business activity. It has been
pointed out that the condition of credit has a direct bearing
upon business and stock prices. High money rates are brought
about by increased activity and an overextension of credit.
Low money rates follow decreased production and ultimately aid
in resumption of business activity when the necessary adjust-
ments in supply and demand have been completed. -Ji
Obviously statistical data are of primary importance to
the investor, measuring as they do, the trend of human activity.
But statistical records of any sort are liable to be inaccurate,
and the margin of error is increased w^hen the statistics deal
See Appendix, page 105, August 13,1929
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with human relationships.* As indicators of general trends,
however, they are valuable, but it is always necessary to use
judgement and discretion in their interpretations.* Not only
is it important to be &ble to recognize the trend of the baro-
meters, but to heed the signs when they appear. This is one
of the hardest things for the majority of investors and specu-
lators to do. They often may recognize the signs, but more
often do not act accordingly. High money rates in 1929 before
the crash were given scant attention by speculators. Even the
warning of so eminent an authority Secretary of the Treasury
Andrev/ J. Mellon, early in 1929 that it was "a good time to
buy bonds" failed to dampen the enthusiasm of the speculator.
V.liat brings a turn ? Quite frequently the question is
asked: "7Jhat migkes securities stop going dovm in a liquidating
movement, when pessimism is almost universal?" There is a good
deal of logic behind this question. It may be ansv^ered, hov.-ever,
by calling attention once more to the psychological truth that
a small percentage of individuals do not follow the crowd.
They are the ones viho are willing to buy stocks and bonds, but
"at a price". There is a purchaser for every seller, and,
during the period when fear is rampant, those individuals
call up their broker and name prices at which they are A-ill-
ing to purchase stocks. It was reported, for example, that
during the break in October snd November, 1929, brokers hac
* Forecasting Stock Market Trends, F. 293, Van Strum.
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orders to buy American Telephone stock et 150. The stock
did not decline to that figure, but this illustrates the point
that no matter how dark and gloomy the situation is, there are
some people who htve money, and the courage to buy good securi-
ties if they can get them at fair prices. As the general level
of prices becomes lower, the number of these people increases,
until the point finally is reached when the demand from this
source equals or exceeds the supply of stocks offered. This
brings about the so-called "turn".-}: The buyers are aided in
this by the activities of the "short"' interest. The short
sellers sell stocks vri-th the idea of buying them at a lov/er
price, •'•hen the market shows evidences of becoming oversold,
they buy the stocks they have sold previously, or "cover".
Here again, the human element asserts itself, because there
is a larger number of short sellers at the end of a decline
than at the beginning. V^hen stock prices start to rise and
give evidence that the recovery may be substantial, the "shorts"
begin to "cover" and this tends to accentuate the rise.
Bonds. Bonds usually are the senior indebtedness of a
company. They may or may not be secured by a mortgage. The
rate of interest is fixed and the majority of bonds are calla-
ble at a stated price at a designated time. For this reason the
fluctuations in bonds are not so marked as in common stocks,
with the exception of those issues which have additional con-
versation features or have stock purchase warrants stteched to
them. But at the same time, bonds are influenced by underlying
i^-See Appendix^ page 108, Nov. 13, 1929.
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conditions to a considerable extent. Lov/ noney r^-.tes,
for example, usually create higher prices for bonds. Here
again the human element is noticeable. It is good business
to place surolus funds in sound bonds yielding from 4^to
vrhsn the return on collateral loans and comriercial paper is
2 to 5%, The increased demand creates higher prices. Converse-
ly, when call money and commercial paper rates rise, the income
from bonds is not so attractive, and more fiinds are placed in
the sources offering the highest return. There also may be con-
siderable selling of bonds in order to take advantage of the
higher rates elsewhere. This brings about lower prices for
bonds. For this reason the bond market is watched to ascertain
possible trend of stock prices. Under normal conditions, rising
bond prices precede higher stock prices and a decline in bonds
normally is a forerunner of a decline in stocks. There may be a
considerable el&pse of time during the movements of the different
class of securities, hov;ever, and for this reason the relation-
ship between the movements sometimes is lost si^t of, but the
reasons for an ?^dvance or decline in bond prices are so funda-
mental that it is unwise to ignore them. Fluctuations in the
bond market not only are indicative of future stock prices but
of business con d itions as well. Higher bond prices indicate
confidence in the business outlook.
Too often, hovrever, investors overemphasize the element
of safety in a bond, Viliilte bonds have priority over stock they
are just as dependent upon the soundness and earning capacity of a
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company. Consequently, v/hen the earning pov/er of a concera is
so reduced that its future outlook is obscure, the bonds of the
company are as likely to decline as the stocks, although not
al\rays in the same proportion. Then, too, a great deal depends
upon the capitalization of a coinpany, ".ihen a corporation has
no funded debt, the earnings accrue to the stockholders, but
v/hen the funded indebtedness is laj-ge, holders of the junior
bonds may be in a less desirable position than the stockliolders
of a company with simple capital structure. It may easily be
recognized, therefore, that one cannot say that bonds ar/mys
are better than stocks. Such a statement depends upon circi-im-
stances
.
In the event of a reorganization, bondholders usually,
but not always, fare better than holders of the common shares.
First mortgage bondholders receive the best offer in such an
event because their bonds are secured by a mortgage upon the
property, and often the reorganization is brought about by a
committee of bondholders. Preferred shareholders usually
receive some consideration, and the common shareholders may or
may not participate. There have been many cases, of course,
in which ail classes of securities have been wiped out. This
is indicated by records of thousands of obsolete co::;panies,
which may be found at every 6tate capital.
The public demand for common stocks in the bull market
which ended in 1929 created a great increase in the number of
bonds with speculative features. In fact, the total value of
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bonds issued during 1929 without some feature of this sort was
very small, and was confined to the soundest industrial rail-
road or utility companies. Tith the lessening of the specula-
tive craze for commonstocks
,
however, bonds without these addi-
tional attractions again became more popular.
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CONCLUSIONS
IJkrket for securities essential in present economic life.
At the bottom of every "business depression and financial
panic, a great deal of talk is made about abolishing the markets
of securities. These statements usually/- originate vdth individ-
uals v^ho have been financially crippled in the decline or from men
who desire publicity, either for political reasons or othervdse.
It is conceivable that an unorganized market for securities would
bring about an undesirable state of affairs. IfThile it is true
that many abuses have materialized in the security markets, the
fault is not so much with the market as in the attitude of the
public. Those who desire to gamble have found the stock market
an excellent medivim. But the stock market does no-^ possess a
monopoly upon the human desire to "take a chance", as we have
pointed out. Furthermore ,an organized stock market gives in-
vestors a ready source for turning their securities into cash
in the shortest possible time. It causes more frequent publica-
tion of earnings and financial standing of the companies whose stocks
are listed. The losses that are sustained in the stock market
are .just as real in other forms of investment. The nurchassr
of real estate is obliged to experience a similar fluctuation
in value, except that when the market value of his house goes
down he does not sell, because he wants to live in it, '.Tbenever
the speculative element becomes active in any form o-^ human
endeavor, exces.ses materialize and losses are sustained. There-
fore, the conclusion which may be reached as to the necessity
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for an organized market for securities is that it aids the
real investor; that as far as speculation is concerned, the
whole history of the human race has revealed that this is an
inherent trait, and that the remedy for the evils VThich arise
consists not in the elimination of the source but in its
proper regulation.
The matter of regulation, hovrever, brings up a rather
controversial subject. The attitude of the stock exchange
authorities has been that this institution should provide a
free and open market for securities. This has caused the
complaint that certain undesirable practices have crept into the
business. During the very active days in 1929, when the "tape"'
vTSLS an hour to three or more hours behind the actual transac-
tions, the person who bought or sold stocks could not tell
whether he was getting a fair price. It was a comparatively
easy matter for a broker to deduct a fraction or even a point
or more from the price received. Suppose, for example, a cus-
tomer ordered his broker to sell "at the market''. The broker
mi^t easily credit the sale on his custoner»s accoTint at 50,
although he had sold the stock for 50^;- or even 51. Vith the
ticker several hours late, and with daily fluctuations over a
wide range, the customer would be at a disadvantage in deter-
mining vfhether the stock v/as sold at the price vrhich he was
credited. In fact, complaints v/ere quite frequent during
1929 from customers of brokerage offices that vrhen they wished
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to sell, the price they received was the lavr for the day, but
when they bought the price always v/as at the high for the day.
The adoption of the "high-speed" tickers by the .Vestem
Union Telegraph Company, has eliminated one phase of this prac-
tice, in that the transactions are printed on the tape soon
after they are completed, but in the event of another period
of extreme activity, the same situation might materialize
again. The only 7/-ay to completely eliminate such practices
would be to adopt a rule to make customers name a price for
purchase or sale, but this could not be adopted without wider
knovfledge of the actual value of the various shares. In any
event, the purchase or sale "at the market", gives a btoker-
age firm considerable advantage over the customer if it is
the type of firm to do so# It may be argued that this is a
trivial matter, but it could and probably has involved mil-
lions of dollars in past year-^.
The need for regulation also is desirable in the calibre
of the men v/ho receive licenses to deal in stocks including
brokers, salesmen, customers' men and those v/ho othervrise are
in a position to influence the investing public in the selection
of securities, liost investors accept the opinion of these indi-
viduals as authoritative, but, as previously has been pointed
out, these men too frequently are more concerner; in selling
securities under.vritten by their ovm organizations, or in
getting the largest possible coinmissions, than in the best
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interest of the customer, Certaihly, men '.7ho are placed in
a position to advise investors regarding the best type of se-
curities for their particular needs, should be men who have
had sufficient experience, and v/ho have demonstrated that their
judgement is so\md.
Education , But at the same time, brokers and their asso-
ciates frequently are not so much to blame for their apparent
shallovmess as the investors who deal v/ith them. People be-
lieve what they want to believe, and it is natural for those
who are dependent for livelihood upon commissions from pur-
chase and sale of stocks to give the investing public the
kind of service it desires to have. Then too, brokers realize
that their clientele constantly is changing. Each "bull"
market brings new groups to the board rooms, and by the time
they have learned their lesson, they either have lost all their
surplus ftmds, or have learned that the stock market is not the
easy place for making money that they imagined it to be. The
w^ise ones also learn that the only sound method by which they
can make money in stocks is to buy the best issues when they
appear cheap and hold them. Therefor, the best method by
v;-hich the cure for speculation may be attained is through ed-
ucation. This is a slow process, hovirever, and, in view of the
highly technical nature of finance and economics, it is not
readily grasped, A scholar may learn through text books that
stocks should be bought when they are cheap and sold when they
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are high or "^dear" , "but it is a different natter to apply this
principle to actual practice. They af^;ain, the professor of
econondcs may expound to his classes the truth of the laws
of supply and deraand, untility and value, prices and produc-
tion, effect of credit upon business, "but the young mn or
woman just entering business or professional life cannot be
expected to grasp the full significance of these truths xintil
they are directly influenced by them through the costly lesson
of experience. Furthermore, the young man or vraman in high
school and college may be taught the principles of economics
but subsequently enter a business or profession in v;hich this
kind of knowledge has little chance for practical application,
so they forget nearly all they have learned about the subject.
These factors, coupled vrith the wide differences in human na^
tTire, make the development of a more general knov/ledge of
sound investment policies an extremely difficult matter.
Education in financial matters should embrace the form
of financial statements, as well as an understanding of their
meaning. Too frequently in the past investors have been mis-
lead by false figures. This could oe eliminated partly by
uniform financial statements. Accountan^have advocated this
for some years. Of coursCj different kinds of businesses re-
quire statements suited to their particular needs. The ac-
coxinting system of a mining or oil company would not be
applicable to the manufacturing firm. The principal need.
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hotvever, is to require companies in the same industry to use
similar accoxmting methods, so that the investor can make a
bettor and more intelligent comparison betT^veen tvio companies
of the same kind*
Closely allied v^ith the above are the loose methods of
many companies in reporting earnin|T;s to stockholders. In
recent years there has been a tendency on the part of cor-
porations to publish earnings quarterly, but sorae still cling
to the old idea of publishing earnings but once a year. Pres-
ent day business operation are so complex that much can happen
in a year. "If the shareholder is, after all, the actual
ovmer of the corporation, should he not have complete and
accurate knowledge of the operations of his business", asks
The Financial .TorId, a weekly financial publication, "or
should this information be reserved exclusively for the man-
agement, remembering that the latter are in reality the em-
ployees of the shareholder"
?
There is little cause for complaint in the case of rail-
road reports and those of the larger utility companies, but
in the case of many industrial corporations, particularly
some of the most prominent ones, there still exists a tenden-
cy to make an annual statement tell as little as possible to
the shareholders. To quote the Financial orld ap^ain: ".."hile
in a surprisingly large number of cases the shareholder is left
in complete ignorance as to the amount of gross business his
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company is doing, many more of those corporation v/hich do
report sales, or gross earnings, Ixamp under e single head
and a single item all of those deductions v;hich have been
made in determining the amount of net earnings. The ov.ner
of the Company's stock is entirely justified in asking .just
what the item includes; the description 'operating expenses'
depreciation, taxes, etc' may give some clue, but the 'etc,
might mean almost anything. Perhaps pert of the blame for
the brevity and lack of actual information of some of the
corporate reports is traceable directly to the shareholder
himself, because of his apparent indifference". It is con-
ceivable, hov/ever, that there must be a vast variation in
the accounting method of the J'lmerican Telephone & Telegraph
Company, 'Arith assets of over four billion dollars, v-'hich
reports annual earnings of .;10 to ¥'14 sfaare per c.nnun and
the Archison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railroad, which hrs assets
of eroijnd :ii;l,500,000,000, but which reports earnings from
|15 to -1^25 a share per annum. Certainly the largest public
utility company in the -Aorld should have as I'^rge earnings
per share annually as the premier railroad. Theye are some
of the factors that investors have to contend mth, so it is
small wonder that figures often are confusing to those \iho
do not know what their full significance is even under the
miost favorable conditions.
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Hore general knowledge of financial matters and proper
regulation also vrould prevent to a considerable extent "doc-
toring" financial statements under certain conditions. Just
as some large corporations vrlth huge earning povfer endeavor
to cover up true earnin<^s, otheisvrith declining earnings some-
times "juggle" figures to make them look better than they
really are. This frequently is done v/hen financing is be-
ing arranged, so that the new securities v.dll look attrac-
tive to investors. It may also be attempted when the "insid-
ers" v^ant to get out before the majority of the shareholders
learn that something is vrrong with the outlook for a company.
This may be regarded as one of the most v cious forms of prop-
oganda, for the average investor has no means of deterr.iining
the true from the false, and, in fact, neither can the exper-
ienced observer without more than the usual care in analyzing
the statem.ents. As a matter of fact, some ver^'- shrev/d business
men often have oeen fooled in this manner.
The Future . Our study has shovm that the majority of
people are so constituted mentally that they are not fitted
for successful speculation, and for this reason most of them
are destined to lose. It is recognized ho\7ever, that the de-
sire for gain has become so ingrained into h\.ur.an nature that
it is futile to try to eliminate this factor from, our present
form of economic life. But it is conceivable that a good deal
of improvement could be made in the public attitude tov.^ard
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investment and speculation. Until it is recognized that the
stock market is not i^.erely a gambling place, but a market
v/here one is able to buy an interest in the groat industrial,
railroad and utility enterprises in the country and through-
out the v^orld, losses v.ill alv/ays be experienced by most of
the stock market traders. Furthermore, it must be recognized
that the only sound basis for expecting ipn improvement in
the value of a stock over a period of years is the norr.'ial
grovth of the company it represents. "Tiere the understand-
ing of this truth ceases, speculation and gambling begins,
finally the stock market and business cycles are so funda-
mentally human in their characteristics that a knowledge of
human nature is essential for the intelligent investment of
surplus funds. Solon, Athenian sage and lawgiver, said,
"Know Thyself". '/.This thought m&y be copied by the present
day investor who would invest his money intelligently and
wisely in a thorough understanding of the "human element
in the security markets".
Cyclopedia of Practical Quotations, page 509 dd.
it
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APPENDIX
Page 39. Accoiantants and conservative investors regard
10 times earnings a fair valuation for a stock. Th.at
this theory is entirely disregarded during a specu-
lative era, is shown the following table of prices
and earnings during the year 1929.
Stock High Price -1929- Earnings Per Share
American Telephone 310x $12.57
American Can 184^ 3,02
American Tobacco 232i 11.53
Auburn Automobile 514 21.23
Borden Co. 203f 11.00
Consolidated Gas, 'bl.Y. 182 • 4,75
E.I.duPont de Nemours 145x 6,99
Eastman Kodak 264|- 9,57
Electric Auto Lite 174 11.37
General Electric 403 8.97
General Motors 91^ 5,44
International Harvester 142 7,11
Johns I'danville 242-|- 8,09
Hash Motors 118 7/8 6,60
Otis Elevator 333f 15,96
Public Service of N.J. 124 7/8 3.93
Standard Oil of N.J. 83 4.75
Standard Oil of N.Y. 48 l/s 2,23
United Fruit 158i- 6,78
United States Rubber 65 Deficit
United States Steel 26l| 21,19
Western Union 272t 15,12
IVestinghouse Electric 292 5/8 10,43
westinghouse Air Brake 57;| 2,78
Radio Corp. of America 549 1,59
The above stocks, for the most part, are not
highly speculative, but are the more seasoned issues.
These stocks, therefore, represent the ones that are
chosen by the investor element. A similar list of
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the more speculative stocks, shavf an even v-lder ratio
between market price and earnings, as follows:
Stock
Ad-7a.nce Rxjmely
American Republics
American Zinc
Best & Co.
Briggs Manufacturing
Brockwuy L'otor
Chrysler Motor
Curtis s -.Yright Corp.
Davison Chemical
Foimdation Co.
Hahn Department Stores
Hayes Body Corp,
Grigsby Grunow
Houston Oil
Kolster Radio
Int*l. Paper & Poxver A
Int*l. Combustion Engr'ng
H.R.Jfellinson Co,
Mexican Seaboard Oil
Moto Meter Gauge & Equip,
Moirray Corp, of America
National Bellas Hess
J, C, Penney Co,
Simmons Co,
United Electric Coal
High Price -1929- Earnings Per Share
104 7/8
64f
49-^
123i
63 l/8
73 7/8
135
30 i/e
69 l/8
69 5/8
56-1
68 3/8
70
167
78f
44|
103#
39 3/8
69 3/8
35 3/8
100 7/8
234
105-1
188
81 1/8
Deficit
II
50.16
4.20
1.21
.54
4,94
Deficit
3,34
1.95
1.85
Deficit
.87
4,78
.20
Deficit
ti
ti
.02
,31
1.69
Deficit
4.50
4,15
2.24
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Pages 47,62,07,69,76,81,83. In order to shovr tho
relationship betiveen daily occurrences and
stock market activities, the folloi'/ing events
and coitnents are listed fron ner^spaper stock
market reports in the years 1929 and 1930.
These t\TO periods have been chosen because
they more accurately reflect the type of events
that are given greater consideration during the
last stages of an upv/ard movement and in the
latter stages of a dovOT^ard movonent.
January 1, 1929. United States Rubber
vras one of the strong features, advancing 4 points,
on reports that du Pont interests vrero becor.iing
identified with the company.
January 11. The New York Traction stocks
Y/ere strong due to reports that these corapanies
would be granted an increase in fares fron 5 cent
to 7 cents. Interboro Rapid Transit gained 3 points
•
^ These rumors later proved false and the stocksdeclined.
January 21. Utility stocks vrere strong,
reflecting rumors of ponding mergers. Electric Bond
& Share advanced 6 poinos and Am. Super Povrer A 9
points.
January 28. Reflecting report of a recap-
italization plan, "Llectric Bond cc Share vras oxtror.-.oly
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active. The first sale for the day tms 20,000 shares
at 2744, an advance of 49 points from the previous close.
The stock closed at 256, iTith a gain of 30 points for
the day.
February 4, 1929. New flight of Colonel Lindburgh
to Cuba and South America caused a rise in the airplane
stocks. wright Aeronautical Corp. stock advanced 9 points,
and Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor gained 10 points.
February'' 7. The stock market dropped sharply due
to stem warning of the Federal Reserve Board regarding use
of member bank credit for speculation. As a result of the
day's trading, the Dow Jones industrial average dropped
11,43 points.
There comes a time in an up\'7ard movement when good news
fails to have a stimulating effect upon stocks. This was
shown on L^arGh 22, 1929, when the price of cooper metal ad-
vanced to 23 cents a poxmd. Despite this development,
however, the copper shares remained practically unchanged.
On April 13, the coppers were sold freely v/hen the price of
the metal declined.
This also was noticeable in the motor group during
April of 1929. Comment in the column of Arthur J. Bean,
financial editor of the Boston Post, on April 11, 1929, Tvas
as follows: "The motor stocks are acting far from well.
"iThile there is no acute weakness, they fail to participate
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in rallies and slip off rather easily in reactions",
my 2, 1929. General Electric stock vre.s stror^,
advancing 9^ points on a report that the stock v/ould he
split.
llay 7. Radio Corp. stock was v^eak, losing 6
points when earnings of 35 cents a share for the first
quarter vrere published.
May 8. American Sugar Refining stock advanced
4 points, reflecting announcement that the stock had beon
placed on a annual dividend basis,
lilay 9. Criticism of the Federal Reserve Board by
the President of the New York Stock Exchange caused a wave
of confidence. The attitude of the orofessional operators
Tra.s described as "cocky", and as a result of the day*s
trading the Dorr Jones industrial average rose 4,53 points.
May 14, Packard Motor stock advanced 14 points on
the announcement that a successful test flight had been
made vdth an airplane using the comparys nevr Diesel Engine,
May 16. Strength in the Tobacco issues was accom-
panied by rumors that the manufacturers would soon raise
the price of cigarettes. American Tobacco rose 3 points,
Liggett & Myers 2 points and Lcrillard 3 points,
IJiay 21, The stock market failed to respond to
favorable decision of the U. S. Supreme Court on the St,
Louis & O'Fallon Railway rate case. This decision ims
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regarded as vital to the railroads in that it placed the
valuation of the railroads for rate making TJurposes at
current reT^roduction costs, instead of 1913 values.
I^y 23, 1929. Arthur J. Bean, financial editor of
the Boston Post, said, regarding an expected increase in
the rediscount rate: "A 6% rediscount rate \vould, perhaps,
be largely psychological, inasmuch as the conmercial money
market has "been at or above this level for some time",
I«Iay 27, IJail order stocks were weak, reflecting
lower grain prices, and the effect this vfould have upon the
purchasing power of the far-.i industry, llay wheat dropped
to 98 s/s cents a bushel, Ivlontgomery V/ard and Sears Roe-
buck each declined 5 points,
June 13, 1929, Strength in the public utilities
attributed to the fact that half a dozen pov.-erful groups
of public utility interests were competiting actively in
buying companies over a vride area,
June 21, Arthur J, Bean, financial editor of the
Boston Post, commenting on the speculation in public util-
ities, said: "In one respect the big speculation in the
public utilities resembles the Florida land boom. Very
fev; now try to do any figuring as to earnings or values,
Rised on earnings around $6 per share. Consolidated Gas is
one of the cheapest of the public utilities ^.t around 125
in spite of its rise. Yet there are many other issues
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earning one-half this araoxmt per share which are selling
higher than Consolidated GaS. Of course, the utility
situation is in the throes of consolidation vrhere less
duplication of expenses and expansion may make radical
improvement in earning power, but the average speculator
is in no position to knov/ vrfiat companies are in a position
to increase earnings sharply. Some well-informed public
utility interests have told the writer that they are en-
tirely unable to visualize earnings to warrant present
prices for many of these issues".
June 27, 1929, The aircraft stocks were sold freely
on the announcement of an amalgamation of 'Jright, Curtiss
and other important units, V/right Aeronautical drop-oed 8
points and Curtiss 3 points,
July 8, 1929, Sharp rise of 4 points in Columbia
C-raphophone v/as accompanied by a rumor that an important
deal might be consummated v.rithin a few weeks. The fact
that the stock had the backing of J.P.Morgan & Co. lent
additional speculative value to the rimor.
July 11. American Tobacco rose 4 points on report
that stock vra.s to be split 2 for 1.
July 18. Rise of 2 points in U S Steel points, was
due to continued high rate of production during the sximmer
months, ordinarily a period of lower operations,
July 31. General Electric reached a new high for
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all time, gaining 10 points to 377-^7, based on expectations
that a split of the stock would be announced shortly,
August 1, 1929. Reported pool operations in Gillette
Safety Razor caused the stock to advance 8 points. Fantastic
predictions as to price stock would sell for in a short time
were circulated,
August 6. Stock market was easier because of rumor
that Secretary of the Treasury Mellon was considering re-
tiring from active service,
August 7. Sharp rise in Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe
Railroad stock to above 270 ^ivas accompanied by the rumor that
the company would capitalize its large surplus by a stock
dividend of 50% or more,
August 9, Stock market experienced a severe break,
reflecting the raise in the rediscount rate of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York from 5% to 6%, The Dow Jones in-
dustrial average dropped 14. points, the railroad average
4,73 points and the copper average 3,30 points,
August 13, Arthur J, Bean, Financial Editor of the
Boston Post, commenting on the position of the stock market,
said: "The mental attitude of speculators the country over
is an interesting study at the present time, Most of -hem
seem pretty well convinced that nothing can stop the upward
movement. The situation has gotten beyond the point where
money rates are of much influence. The conservative element
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look upon this as a dangerous situation, but the active
bulls point to the stocks which are moving and refer to
their sponsors",
August 14, 1929. One of the features in the mrVet
on this date was Gillette Safety Razor stock ivhich rose 8
points to 136, a new high. The rise v.-as attributed to
"pool" activities.
August 16. The oil stocks were strong, accoTnmnied
by a rumor that the Morgan interests would soon launch a huge
oil investment trust, as well as favorable reports relative
to the stabilization of the industiry.
August 19. NeT;-s on this date hinted quite definitely
that distribution was in process. A number of market students
were mentioned as believing that spectacular movements in a
comparatively few issues was for the purpose of effecting dis-
tributi on.
September 3, 1929. The Dow Jones industrial and rail-
road averages reached the high point for the bull market on
this date, the former being 381.17 and the latter 189.1].
From this date tmtil November 13, the market continued to decline
interrupted by periods of strength. The industrial average on
that date was 198.69.
September 16. *Comment on the stock market on this date
was as follows: "The stock market has reached a point where
enthusiasm must be kept up in order to keep up prices. As soon
* Financial Editor's Notes, Boston Post.
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as the market starts to lag the selling increases. Of
course, the psychology of this situation is that a great
many speculators have the idea that some day the market is
going to take a big drop, but the market has fooled then so
long that they are willing to go v/ith the tide, until defi-
nite signs of recession appear",
October 3, 1929. Decline in the market on this date
was characterized as the v^orst since early in ]926, when
publishing of the brokers' loans for the first ti-ne brought
about a sharp decline. The industrial "average" v/as down
14.55 points. Contment on the market stated that "Distressed
selling was the feature of the market during the last hour
and no respect vras paid to -'/alues".*
October 19, *Stock market reports on this date said:
"The market indicates that is is reaching the last stages of
the liquidating movement. Frightened selling in the last
hour yesterday was the feature. Of course it is impossible
to tell hov/ far the movement will go especially after such a
long period of active speculation for the rise. In down-
ward movements, stocks often sell belov/ their value just as
they rise above their value during bull movements".
October 21. Over 6,000,000 shares changed hands on
this date, and it vms estimated that over SO'/.' of the selling
was on the part of those who vrere either fri,^htened into
selling or were forced to sell by their brokers,
* Financial Editor's Notes, Boston Post,
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October 24, 1929, The industrial average on this
date declined 20,66 points, and reports on the market
stated: "Vfe are v/itnessing the same mob psychology on the
down side that was witnessed months ago on the up side
when the most ridiculous prices were freely predicted.
At that time there seemed no limit to public demand, now
there seer.s no limited to the distressed selling,"*
October 29. Selling reached its apex on this
date, when 16,410,000 shares changed h-mds. Brokers
y/orked all night in an efT"ort to keep up with the huge
volume of business,
October 30, Stock market had a sharp rally, with
voUune of trading at 10,727,300. A good deal of the
buying was attributed to investment buying, by those who
desired to get stocks at lov; prices,
November 13, On this date, v/hen the lows for
the 1929 decline '.vere attained, a bid for 1,000,000 shares
of Standard Oil of New Jersey at 50 was reported. This
had a stimulating effect on the market the follovring day,
because it indicated that banking interests were prepared
to support the market.
As a result of this movement the market rallied
18,59 points on the following date, Nov, 14. and continued
to advance ',7ith intermediate declines until April 17, when
Financial Editor's Notes, Boston Post
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the industrial average reached 294.07
The follovring items, taken from nev/spaper reports
in the latter part of 1930, indicate the changed attitude
on the part of speculators, as compared v/ith 1929. It
will "be noted that more attention is given to unfavorable
reports.
June 4, 1930. United States Steel declined nearly
3 points due to report of decreased steel operations.
June 11. Financial comment on this date was as
follows: "If one listened to the gloomy talk of those specu-
lators who were so bullish last year at the top of the market,
he would be led to belief that depression was normal and rOod
business abnormal. As a matter of fkct, depression is ab-
normal and, therefore, cannot long endure. Of couree, \re
cannot expect th^t the rank and file of speculators vrill buy
near the bottom or sell around the top. This never has
happened, and never ^11",*
June 16. Liissouri Kansas Pipe Line v.-as one of the
sensational features on the decline, dropping 15 points. The
reason given for the abrupt decline ivas that the stock had been
"pegged" during its advance and that this was accompemied by
countri-.Tride selling of the stock. Selling became so urgent
that the sponsors v.'ere \anable to continue supporting it,
July 3, 1930. Comment on the dull, sagging market of
this date was as follows: "Special yreakness in a few issues
* Financial Editor's Kotes, Boston Post.
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when the jperket is in the bottom area are the reverse
of those upvard rushes vrhen the morV-et is in the top
area. During both extremes the market gives a wrong
impression. At the top it seems as though all prices
were going skyv/ard, but bhe average of the market does
not get anywhere. On the other hand while some stocks
look very weak at present, the market as a whole does
not decline much,"*
July 28, 1930, Warner Bros. Pictures stock
declined 3 points on report that dividend v/ould be cut
or paid in scrip.
,
August 1, Marked weakness in Consolidated Gas,
Public Service Corp. of New Jersey and other public
utility stocks was attribute'^ to selling by interests
who expected a reduction in electric light and power
rates in Uew York City and in other cities, coincident
with the reduction in rates ordered in Boston
August 6, Stock market reactionary on possible
effect of the hot weather on the corn crop. The Dow
Jones industrial average declined 4 points,
August 7, Chicago, ^ock Island & Pacific Rail-
road stock declined nearly 4 points and Southern Railway
4 points due to the belief that lessener! crops v/ould
reduce the tonnage of these roads in the following months,
Financial Editor* s Notes, Boston Post
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August 12, 1930. Arthur J. Bean, financial editor
of The Boston Post, commenting on the ps7^chological attitude
of speculators, said: "The writer has seen people thoroup;hly
frightened many times during depressions, hut it does not
seem as though there are more people scared now than ever
before. Perhaps it is because so man^/^ people navr are in-
terested in the stock market"
.
August 15. Stock market rallied sharply on nevrs from
chief agricultural centers that the drought had been oartially
broken. The industrial "average" gained 7,47 points,
August 18, Fox Film declined. 5 points because of
rumors that the dividend would be cut or passed. Decline
also partly attributed to professional "bear" operations,
August 22, American Tobacco B, advanced over 5 points,
reflecting the announcement that sales of "Lucky Strike"
cigarettes ^ov the month of July had established a record to
that date,
August 28. Goodyear Tire k Rubber stock decMned about
3 points following the announcement t^at wages of executives,
sales and office forces vrould be cut 10 per cent. Comment on
this action was as follov/s: "There was a time when such a
development xvould be considered bullish, but the financial com-
m.unity has changed its opinion concerning the effect of wage
reductions. "*
September 13, 1930, Comment on attitude of the public
* Financial Editor's Notes, Boston Post,
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toward the stock market on this date was as follows:
"The psychological effect of reactions upon close follov/ers
of the market after a long period of depression is inter-
esting. Speculators have been through so much that even
a small technical decline will cause "^hem much v;orry. "
Septemher 26, Financial reports on hhis date read:
"Brokers say that most of ^he selling for customers is not
of the distressed sort, but is largely for small holders
whose nerves have been so fro-ye'l by the many discouraging
reactions that they have sold out, vo^vlng never to buy
stocks again. At this stage of the market it is easy to
see why bull movements following depressions have to go a
long way before the speculative public again is enticed into
the market."*
October 3, 1930, "Bear" operators tried to upset
the market by special pressure on a few issues, namely
Montgomery 'Tard, Radio and Southern Railroad, which -Trere
moderatly la.Tor,
October 8, Interesting comment upon the type of in-
dividuals who buy stocks after a decline -was reflected in the
financial editor's nohes of the Boston Post on rhis date, as
follows: "A wealth investor who bought 20,000 shares of s-ock
in yesterday's break said to the ';vriter: 'I an buyin- stocks,
not because I think business may pick up t^^is year. I am
buying them because at their present prices practically all
* Financial Editor's Notes, Boston Post.
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stocks have discounted poor business ''or inany months to
come ",
October 10, 1930. Sensational drot) in Fox :^*"''n
from 38 to 29 and an equally shar'p rebound bo 37 '.vas dup-
licated by several other issues, the inference being that
soT-ie large interest \txs forced to thro7r over a huge amount
of stock.
October 23. "A broker made a canvass of his board
rocm yesterday and found 22 bears, 15 bulls and one customer
*on the fence*. He said that the bears v/ere muc^ more con-
fident of their position, however, than the bulls, and added
'This is the best indication that we are near the bottom that
I have seen for some time*
October 30. Directors of Bethlehem Steel declared the
regular quarterly di-'/ldend of |l.50 per share on the common
stock. Despite this action, however, the stock declined 1:^-
points, indicating the pessimistic attitude of speculators near
the bottom of a declining movement.
October 31, Gillette Safety Razor declined points
and Autostrop Safety Razor 4 points in response to a suit brought
by stocldiolders asking for redress for b^e action of the directors
in permitting the Gillette Company to buy its a>vn stock,
November 3, 1930. Monthly letter of the National City
Bank of New York expressed the opinion that "There can be little
doubt but that the depression in this country is scraping on
bottom". Despite this and similar statements, however, the s'-ock
* Financial nldihor's Notes, Boston Post.
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market declined 5,58 points on the average on Nov, 5. and
reached the 1o;t point for the "bear" market on Dec, 17,
when the industrial average v/as 157.51.
November 17, 1930. Stock market vreis weak due to
reports of bank failures in Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas
and Kentucky, bringing number of failures up to 19 in three
days
.
December 2, 19.S0. American .Toolen preferred gained
4 points, reflecting reports that conditions in the industry
\vere improving. Commnet on the rise in this stock said:
"Incidentally, this event called renewed attention to the way
different groups of stocks have come forvmrd in recent v/eoks,
reflecting slight business improvement. At first it was the
coppers, then the motors and rubber stocks. Yesterday the
steel stocks and the biggest unit in the vroolen trade were
prominent".* This is an illustration of the tendency on the
part of farseeing investors to buy stocks when they believe
the turn is near.
December 5. German bonds vrere strong for the first
time in many weeks, advancing 2 points. Previously these
bonds had been weak due to the fear that a moratorium night
be declared,
December 11. Stock market declined on the Baiik of
United States in New York had failed. Industrial average
declined 3,67 points,
* Financial Editor's Notes, Boston Post.
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December 16, 1930. Indus-fcrial average declined
5,83 points to the year's la.v of 157.51, Arthur J. Bean,
financial editor of the Boston Post, made the follov^ing
comment: "There has been a good dea] of selling by T)eople
who do not have to do so, and ought to know better than to
sacrifice their property. The reason for this is thgt there
has been an undercurrent of feeling, born of the vicissitudes
of the past year, that somehow this depression is unlike others
-ffe have had, and that the outlook is therefore more hopeless.
It is the same psychology reversed, which was noted at the top
of the boom, when so many people thoug^ht that 'conditions were
different'. If there is any one thing that a stud--- of econ-
omics over the centuries reveals, it is that there is abso-
lutely nothing new under the sun. It is because of this hope-
less feeling today that stocks are all but being given away.
The psychology of the present hour is perilous to those who are
swayed by it".
Following this loiv point the stock market recovered and the
improvement helped to dispell a good deal of the gloom that was
widely prevalent at the low point.
The years 1929 and 1930 offer an excellent opportunity for
the student of stock market and business psychology to learn how
events, emotions and depressions effect security prices. The
World Almanac, in its financial and economic revieiv for 19?0,
also mentions some of the human elements which the events of the
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year revealed. The review says in part: "At the close
of the year, with eighteen months of depression endured,
with the bulk of speculative wreckage apparently cleared
away, with stock prices rolled bacV, at their lowest, to
early 1927 levels, with coinmodity prices not far above the
pre-war basis, the economc posihion appeared for the first
tisie to have become genuinely and inherently hopeful, due to
the very thoroughness of the readjustment. Looking fonrard
to future revival, the strongest investment buying of a decade
made its appearance. Paradoxical as it raay se°m, ^he 1929-
1930 speculative debacle has done more than anything else to
further the popularity of common stock investment on the oart
of the American people. The misfortunes of speculative
sellers have resulted in an unprecedented transfer of stock
to outright owners, with the result, interesting both in its
social and economic possibilities, that more millions of
Americans are shareholders than ever before".*
* The Vforld Almanac and Book of Facts, 1931, rage 141.
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